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Welcome to the fifth issue of the Combating Terrorism Exchange, beginning 
the second full year of the journal’s publication. You will notice changes 
to the look of the CTX right away, particularly the bold new cover design. 
Graphic designer Ryan Stuart has used the three months since the last issue 
to rethink the look of the entire journal, and we hope you like the results as 
much as we do. We are also excited to see our submissions inbox bringing 
us a variety of papers from an increasing number of sources. If you have 
something you’d like us to look at, please read the submissions guidelines 
(on the final page) and send it in. 
This issue brings together a selection of articles that, somewhat unusually 
for this journal, tend more toward the scholarly than the operational, with 
a couple of notable exceptions. Andy Kraag leads off with the story of the 
Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Force (NL MARSOF). Created 
from two small SOF units to improve efficiency, the force found that cultural 
differences between them badly undermined overall effectiveness. Kraag 
was able to use analytical research and his SOF background to give the unit’s 
command the information it needed to make vital changes that improved 
morale and ensured the group’s continued operational effectiveness.
Nate Moir suggests an equally innovative take on the current Civil Affairs 
Teams that are working in Afghanistan. His proposed Civilian Casualty 
Management Team would combine the training and experience of the 
existing units with networked communications and specialized training to 
better help communities deal with war-related deaths and injuries. Not only 
is this good in itself, Moir notes, but it could serve to undermine anti-
coalition propaganda and improve civil-military relations.
World War Two was a very different war, but its antagonists dealt with some 
problems entirely familiar to those fighting today’s anti-insurgent campaigns. 
Ronny Kristoffersen draws on the stories of two highly effective interroga-
tors in that war—one German, the other American—to discuss the value of 
humane psychological techniques for gathering reliable wartime intelligence. 
Using intelligence in an entirely different way, Geoffrey Kambere shows us 
that the key to defeating the violent Islamist group al Shabaab in Somalia 
is to go after its finances. Substantial revenue streams from the busy port 
of Kismayo, the Somali diaspora, and a cut of pirates’ ransom money 
have enabled the group to keep a deadly stranglehold on large parts of the 
country. Cutting the money flow, Kambere insists, will starve the beast and 
finally defeat it.     
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The key to preventing prisoners released from Guantánamo Bay from 
rejoining the fight, according to author Erich Wagner, is to revitalize the 
time-honored practice of parole. Wagner discusses the importance of termi-
nology for shaping our thinking about these released prisoners, and offers 
some timely ideas about how to make parole, historically rooted in both 
shari’a and European laws of war, a strong tool for dealing with the problem 
of former prisoners who return to the fight.
Our final feature contributor, Gregory Mayer, takes us back to the time 
of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, when Belfast was a war zone, and the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army used terror both to attack its enemies and 
to control its neighborhoods. In an interesting parallel with Kristoffersen’s 
World War Two interrogators, Mayer shows us how similar techniques of psy-
chological persuasion can be used to recruit willing spies from the other side.
This issue’s Ethics column raises the difficult subject of the “hero” label. 
George Lober wonders whether society’s habit of slapping the epithet on 
everyone who dons a uniform diminishes not only the meaning of the word, 
but also the service and sacrifices of real heroes and ordinary personnel alike. 
As always, he gives us something to think deeply about.
Kalev Sepp recommends a film about war in Afghanistan, but not the war 
we’re familiar with. Company 9, about a doomed Russian platoon in the 
waning year of the Soviet Union’s occupation, tells an unnervingly familiar 
story of heroism against impossible odds. The fun, Sepp tells us, is that this 
Russian-made film reflects an authentically Russian sentimentality, complete 
with Soviet-era military equipment—still operational. 
Nate Moir is back with his read on the new book Find, Fix, and Finish: 
Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated 
Al-Qaeda. This is, Nate tells us, “a well-written, fast-paced, and compelling 
overview of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, the Middle 
East, and the United States since 9/11.” Not exactly light summer reading, 
but a thriller you might find hard to put down nevertheless. 
As always, our colleagues at JSOU have some new publications for you to 
check out. These are short, informative reads on timely subjects, available as 
PDFs from the JSOU website.
Finally, I want to welcome Amina Kator-Mubarez to our team of research 
assistants. Amina joined us in May, and has made herself invaluable since 
then, making sure no details of the behind-the-scenes production process are 
overlooked.
Thanks to all our contributors for their hard work getting their submissions 
ready for publication, and thanks as always for your interest in the CTX. I 
look forward to hearing your comments, questions, and suggestions for how 
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Combining Special Operations Forces: A Dutch Case Study
Special Operations Forces (SOF) constantly have to adjust to the 
reality of increasing demand and decreasing national defense budgets. Some 
units are able to expand because of increased demand while others may be 
forced to reduce their size because of budget decreases. The Royal Nether-
lands Marine Corps decided in 2009 to combine its two relatively small SOF 
units into one bigger unit to fulfil the increased demand for SOF operations 
while dealing with decreasing military budgets. This article describes how 
I was able to use research into organizational culture to help the Dutch 
Marines cope with the difficulties of trying to merge two SOF units with dif-
ferent histories and backgrounds into one. There is no one perfect solution 
for organizations facing these changes. My aim is to offer our lessons learned 
to other SOF units, in keeping with the sentiment that an experience not 
shared is an experience lost.
Forging the Netherlands Maritime Special  
Operations Forces
Until recently, the special operations capability of the Dutch Marines 
consisted of two separate units: the Maritime Special Operations Company 
(MSO) and the Unit Intervention Marines (UIM). The MSO was tasked with 
maritime special operations as well as amphibious shaping operations, while 
the UIM focused primarily on countering national terrorist threats. The 
fragmentation of these relatively small SOF units within the Dutch Marines 
left them in a weak position relative to their counterparts, the larger Dutch 
Army SOF (in Dutch, the KCT) and the national police’s special interven-
tion service (DSI). The commander of the MSO, a major, for example, had 
to discuss upcoming missions with the colonel in command of the KCT, a 
fundamental imbalance of power in favor of the KCT. More importantly 
however, with the most severe budget cuts in the the Dutch Defense Forces’ 
history due to be implemented beginning in 2010, all services of the Dutch 
armed forces would be scrutinized for inefficiencies, and while the need for a 
special operations capability was undisputed, senior officers within the UIM 
and the MSO realized that something had to be done if they were to prevent 
their units from being absorbed by larger units.
In 2009, these officers took the initiative, and convinced the Commandant 
of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps to combine their units into what 
would be called the Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces (NL 
MARSOF). They envisioned this newly formed force to be a unique mixture 
of “traditional” maritime special operations and national counter-terrorism 
capabilities. The integration ensured more efficient management of scarce 
personnel, and also put maritime SOF in a more equitable position vis à vis 
the Dutch Army SOF and the national police, as they bid for appropriate 
MAJ Andy Kraag, RNLMC
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tasks and missions. The simplified diagram in figure 1 illustrates the shift to 
the new organizational structure and the improved hierarchical position of 
NL MARSOF. It also illustrates that the creation of NL MARSOF was con-
nected to a larger reorganization of the entire Royal Netherlands Navy. 
The first year of NL MAR-
SOF’s existence was marked 
by serious misunderstandings 
that led to friction con-
cerning, for instance, how NL 
MARSOF should shape and 
develop the joint selection 
process of its new members. 
Aptitude testing via sleep 
deprivation, mental pressure 
through hazing, and arduous 
physical tests were tradition-
ally more important for the 
initial selection and training 
of MSO members than for the 
less expeditionary UIM. The 
two units also had different 
standards for training. The 
MSO training philosophy 
emphasized physical fitness 
and the ability to operate in 
demanding environments 
like the Arctic, mountains, 
deserts, and jungle. This 
required long exercises that 
could add up to nine months away from home each year. In contrast, UIM 
operators were on constant readiness alert in the Netherlands for counterter-
rorism operations, such as hostage rescue missions, which precluded them 
from engaging in long exercises abroad. UIM personnel, therefore, predomi-
nantly focused on maintaining their shooting and close-quarter battle skills 
in short domestic exercises. 
Differences in unit customs and traditions also gave rise to friction. For 
instance, the MSO frogmen used specific induction traditions to familiarize 
the new members with the norms and codes of conduct within the frogman 
community. The UIM did not have a similar rite of passage. In fact, new 
members of the UIM deliberately did not undergo any type of induction 
hazing because it was generally considered  unprofessional. The leadership 
of the UIM also tended to be more hierarchical than the leadership of the 
MSO. One subtle expression of this difference was that members of the MSO 
were typically on a first-name basis with all other members. Within the more 
traditional UIM, members addressed each other by rank. 
In short, everybody within NL MARSOF felt uncertain in the new situation, 
which led to disputes. To say NL MARSOF was in danger of becoming inef-
fective is an exaggeration, but internal bickering and quarrelling did hamper 
Figure 1:  The Creation of NL MARSOF from UIM and MSO1 
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operational effectiveness. Thus, for the unit to function to its maximum 
potential, the MSO and UIM cultures and functions had to be unified in 
much more than just name, while personnel needed a clear understanding of 
the increased strategic utility of NL MARSOF.  
Most of my military life, I’ve worked within the UIM and MSO. As a CT 
intervention specialist and frogman, I’ve gone on multiple deployments with 
both units. I was part of the UIM when the first steps were taken to merge 
the UIM and MSO into NL MARSOF, so I experienced the resulting disrup-
tions firsthand. This background prepared me to be a mediator when NL 
MARSOF was stood up. Moreover, I was lucky enough to attend the special 
operations curriculum at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. This allowed me to step back from the fast-moving operational 
environment and dispassionately investigate the issues within NL MARSOF. 
After some intense discussions with NL MARSOF command, the Com-
mander of the Dutch Marine Corps fighting units tasked me to identify the 
problem and simply “fix it.” 
Surviving in the Bureaucratic Jungle
In the 1970s, Eliot Cohen studied the birth and evolution of elite military 
units. He was primarily interested in the difficulties these new elite units 
face in their struggle with what he called “bureaucratic predators,” and 
concluded that their survival depends heavily on their ability to quickly 
show their utility to military leaders and politicians.2 Elite units, therefore, 
sometimes have to undertake difficult missions to prove their worth to 
regular military and political sceptics. Since then, others have also pointed 
out the necessity for “bureaucratic guerrillas” who protect the interests of the 
SOF unit during its initial phase of existence. These analysts underscore the 
hard struggle new SOF units face in the “bureaucratic jungle,” and highlight 
the vital importance of good performance during a unit’s first operations.3 
Nearly all nations have prioritized Special Operations Forces in the last few 
years, recognizing them to be an exceptionally cost - 
effective instrument of military action and national 
strategy.4 The expected decrease in military budgets in the 
next few years as a result of the strained global economy, 
however, makes burden sharing and restructuring of SOF 
capabilities more likely. U.S. Special Operations Com-
mander Admiral William H. McRaven highlighted this 
concern in his 2012 posture statement before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee.5 His push towards a global 
SOF network will undoubtedly affect the way SOF units 
around the world conduct business in the future. In this 
constant state of change, the potential need for integration 
and the restructuring of national SOF capabilities is clear. 
Currently, NL MARSOF is facing political and organiza-
tional pressure similar to what Eliot Cohen described 
almost 35 years ago. Being the “new kid on the block” 
The Commander… tasked 
me to identify the problem 
and simply “fix it.”
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C-Squadron frogmen conducting beach reconnaissance
puts the organization under a bureaucratic magnifying glass that will focus 
on any signs of weakness. In the current reality of increasing SOF demand 
and decreasing military budgets, NL MARSOF has to be at its strongest and 
most effective to survive its own modern-day bureaucratic predators. 
Tactics to Create Wider Support
Research findings that are rejected by their intended audience are useless. 
Therefore, one of my main concerns was to ensure that my findings would 
receive support from the whole NL MARSOF community. Besides the re-
quired executive approval, I needed to convince most of the men in the unit 
of the value of the research, so they would commit to its findings. Without 
this buy-in, the implementation of any recommendations would be difficult. 
Recognizing this from the start enabled me to incorporate three important 
tactics into my research design, and gain the unit’s commitment to imple-
ment change: the use of mixed methods of research; reliance on communica-
tion in person; and the application of a decent amount of tact. I realize that 
this sounds like common advice out of any management book, but for me 
these tactics worked extremely well. 
SOF personnel are expected to take a critical view of every aspect of their job 
in order to excel in what they do. If I had used just one research method, 
that would have led to some hard questioning of my findings. By combining 
quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview) data, mixed-methods re-
search defuses potential criticism by providing more comprehensive evidence 
on which to base conclusions than would either method alone.6 In the case 
of NL MARSOF, I used a three-step combination of document analysis, 
surveys, and interviews to gather data. The document analysis covered policy 
documents, various existing studies, and official doctrine. The survey was 
to be taken by all members of NL MARSOF, followed up by interviews with 
selected members in order to probe their survey responses more deeply. The 
key to winning the participants’ commitment to the outcome was for me 
to explain this research plan in detail, up front. When such research is seen 
to be credible, participants value the outcome more and thus are more 
willing to devote their time and effort to it. 
Conducting this research was my main job for several months. 
For the members of NL MARSOF, however, anything they 
had to do for the research was in addition to their normal 
workload. Fighting units are constantly busy with exercises and 
deployments, and “down” time is a precious commodity. 
This is why the research goals had to be clear and 
compelling, not only to the people in charge, 
but also to those who would actually have to 
fill out the surveys and do the interviews. 
During the multiple briefings and meet-
ings I held to explain the nuts and bolts of 
the three-step research plan, I repeatedly 
reinforced the goal of helping improve 
NL MARSOF’s operational effectiveness. 
Knowing that SOF operators usually 
I needed to convince most 
of the men in the unit of the 
value of the research.
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thrive on difficult assignments, I emphasized the challenge the unit faced in 
optimizing its performance. This was a time-consuming but necessary effort 
up front that likely improved my chances for success. Ultimately, more than 
ninety percent of NL MARSOF personnel volunteered to participate in the 
research, which is a very high percentage by normal polling standards.
Another method I found helpful for facilitating early commitment was the 
use of pre-testing. This involves discussing the proposed survey and inter-
view questions with a carefully selected test group from the intended audi-
ence before carrying out the research work. Pre-testing is a common method 
used to make sure the survey population will understand and interpret the 
questions as the investigator intends. Another major benefit, however, is that 
this pre-test also initiated some early discussion of my research within NL 
MARSOF. After the pre-test, the participants talked with their team mem-
bers and others about the upcoming survey and interviews, and the word 
spread throughout the rest of the community. I found that picking the right 
individuals for this pre-test was key to building early commitment.
Change, including organizational change, creates uncertainty and stirs 
up emotions that can lead to resistance. Under these circumstances, the 
challenge for the reform planner is to offer constructive feedback without 
offending anyone, so people won’t lose their commitment to the result. The 
unwritten rule to “praise in public, but criticize in private” applies here. At 
the end of the day, it will be those same people who have to implement any 
measures developed from the findings. As it turned out for NL MARSOF, 
some of the findings were fairly harsh concerning specific members of the 
community. I always discussed sensitive outcomes first with the people 
involved before asking their permission to disclose the findings to the rest 
of the community. The fact that I came from the community was a strong 
advantage for me. It created a certain level of trust, but also helped me know 
when, and especially with whom, tact was needed. 
I also made sure to show sensitive findings rather than just tell them, using 
visual tools such as diagrams that objectively summarized results. The 
diagrams helped convince senior members that I wasn’t just expressing 
personal opinions, but was reflecting the community view. I found out 
that by tactfully giving feedback this way, people were better able to accept 
uncomfortable facts. 
The Effect on NL MARSOF
My research focused primarily on the unit culture and strategic utility of 
NL MARSOF. It naturally had a solid theoretical foundation, but the unit’s 
higher command had made clear that I needed practical results from which I 
could develop realistic recommendations. 
Unit Culture Revealed 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies defines military culture 
simply as the way things are done in a military organization. While specific 
The unwritten rule to “praise 
in public, but criticize in 
private” applies here.
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definitions vary, most researchers seem to agree that organizational culture 
generally refers to a set of values, beliefs, and behavior patterns that form the 
core identity of an organization.7 In other words, “culture is to an organiza-
tion what personality is to an individual.”8 Many researchers have studied 
the question of how organizational culture affects organizational perfor-
mance, and have generally agreed that a strong shared culture enhances 
organizational performance. The friction between members of the MSO and 
UIM mentioned earlier was the result of a weakly unified culture within 
NL MARSOF. My goal was to help the MSO and UIM unify their disparate 
cultures, but to make this happen, I first had to define and identify the 
distinctive elements of each.
To capture the relationship between organizational culture and performance, 
I used Daniel Denison’s Organizational Culture Model, a practical model 
that was easy to grasp for end-users like me, and which comes with its own 
surveys and other standardized, user-friendly measure-
ment tools.9 The big advantage of using an existing 
model is that its reliability and validity have previously 
been tested. Denison’s model identifies four cultural 
traits—involvement, consistency, adaptability, and 
mission—which have a strong positive association with 
organizational effectiveness.10 Figure 2 shows Denison’s 
diagram of these four traits, each of which is broken 
down further into three specific indices. Denison calls 
this diagram a Circumplex. Organizations that score 
higher in the model (measured from the center outward 
to the rim) perform better than organizations that score 
lower. According to Denison, “...effective organizations 
are likely to have cultures that are adaptive, yet highly 
consistent and predictable, and that foster high involve-
ment, but do so within the context of a shared sense of 
mission.”11 
Each member of NL MARSOF had to answer sixty 
standardized survey questions borrowed from Deni-
son’s Organizational Culture Survey, or DOCS, linked 
to Denison’s model. These sixty questions were 
augmented by a variety of questions specific to NL 
MARSOF’s situation, for instance, “What is the best way 
in which NL MARSOF can distinguish itself from other 
Dutch SOF units?” 
More than ninety percent of the men participated in 
the survey, which lent the final results considerable 
credibility. The unit’s overall rating was generated by 
comparing our survey results to those of more than 
a thousand other organizations in Denison’s norma-
tive database.13 Figure 3 shows the Circumplex of NL 
MARSOF’s culture. The percentile scores indicate how 
well NL MARSOF ranked in comparison to these 
other organizations. For example, NL MARSOF had a 
Figure 2: Unpopulated Denison Circumplex12
Figure 3: DOCS Circumplex Score for NL MARSOF14
CTX | Vol. 2, No. 3
10
percentile score of 43 in the Empowerment index, meaning that it scored 
higher than 43 percent of the others. Because Denison’s cultural model is 
linked to effectiveness, the score helped highlight NL MARSOF’s level of ef-
fectiveness when compared to other organizations, an objective benchmark 
that proved very appealing to my higher command. 
This particular model’s use of percentiles provided meaning and context to 
the results that absolute scores simply cannot give. Scoring better than only 
5 percent of a thousand other organizations sends a much more alarming 
signal to the command than scoring 5 out of 100 on a random stand-alone 
test.
With weaknesses in specific cultural traits exposed, NL MARSOF could now 
do more than deal solely with the negative symptoms (friction points). For 
example, the overall low scores on the cultural traits Mission and Consistency 
(see figure 4), which are related to an organization’s stability, or its capacity 
to remain focused over time, reflected the internal disagreements on selec-
tion and training.15 So now, instead of wasting energy on the symptoms—
the friction points—NL MARSOF could focus on doing something about the 
cause: its weak cultural traits. This would strengthen the overall culture of 
the unit and thus improve its long-term effectiveness. 
Two examples serve to highlight some of NL MARSOF’s weaknesses. First, 
the low score (4) on the index Strategic Direction & Intent, a component of 
Mission, indicated that leadership has not done a good job of conveying NL 
MARSOF’s strategic purpose and priorities to the men. Clarifying NL MAR-
SOF’s strategic intentions should therefore do a lot to defuse and eventually 
eliminate  this source of friction. The low score on the index Coordination & 
Integration (21), under Consistency, indicated that the sub-units (MSO and 
UIM) were not able to work together, due to organizational boundaries. The 
eventual solution for NL MARSOF involved co-locating the staff members of 
the two units, who had been working at separate locations, to foster famil-
iarity, cooperation, and mutual understanding. 
The visual image of NL MARSOF’s culture, as shown in figure 3, served as a 
wake-up call to the leadership. When I briefed the results to the command 
group, they unanimously, if unhappily, agreed 
that the DOCS model presented a mirror that 
reflected the unit in its present state. 
The next step was easier: to compare the 
DOCS scores of the men from the MSO with 
the DOCS scores of the men from the UIM, 
illustrated in figure 4. Because the members 
understood the culture of their unit of origin, 
this would help me be able to pinpoint the 
differences between the units. I also made 
other comparisons, for instance between ranks 
or function groups, to get more in-depth 
knowledge of the groups’ cultural differences. 
Figure 4 shows that both groups score low on Figure 4: Comparing DOCS Circumplex Scores of UIM and MSO16
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the stability traits (Mission and Consistency). One difference, however, is that 
the men from the MSO score considerably better on the trait Involvement, 
which indicates that they feel more empowered and engaged than the UIM 
men. On the whole, however, the DOCS showed the men themselves that in 
terms of cultural traits they were not all that different. The primary source of 
the combined unit’s friction points was instead an overall lack of confidence, 
captured by the low scores in Mission and Consistency. To improve its effec-
tiveness, NL MARSOF first of all would need to create a clear sense of strategic 
utility, along with a common mindset and identity. The last part of the 
article describes ways in which NL MARSOF is trying to achieve these goals. 
Before they saw this model, most NL MARSOF members knew something 
had to be done to unify and strengthen the unit’s organizational culture, but 
they were not clear on what that was. The DOCS provided the tool to de-
scribe the cultural obstacles NL MARSOF faced, convincing senior leadership 
that the organization could now effectively address its weak points according 
to the four cultural trait areas. Translating something seemingly intangible 
like organizational culture into clearly defined and measurable traits was a 
critical first step for the reform of NL MARSOF.
Strategic Utility as a Core Cultural Trait
The DOCS results showed that the members of NL MARSOF felt the unit suf-
fered from an overall lack of strategic direction, which is arguably the most 
important aspect of organizational development for leadership to address. NL 
MARSOF leaders urgently needed to re-evaluate the organization’s strategic 
utility, and clearly articulate its strategic direction. 
I knew from reviewing  existing studies that there are 
many different approaches to and definitions of SOF 
strategic utility. The framework I developed for NL 
MARSOF uses three dimensions. First is the geographic 
environment in which Dutch SOF operate, which may 
be at sea, on land, or somewhere in between. The 
second dimension, the political domain, is divided into 
domestic counterterrorism missions and full-spectrum 
SOF missions abroad, a distinction roughly similar to 
that between military and policing missions. The third 
dimension, the special operations spectrum, is the full 
range of direct and indirect missions. Direct missions 
pit SOF directly against the enemy, while the indirect 
missions enable indigenous forces and populations 
to engage the enemy. I placed the three dimensions 
(geographic, political, and spectrum) on the three axes of a cube, as shown 
in figure 5. This 3-D diagram represents the entire range of SOF’s strategic 
utility. By identifying NL MARSOF’s degree of engagement on each axis, its 
specific strategic range could be visualized and compared with others’. 
This simple framework generated a useful visual representation of the 
operational focus of NL MARSOF over the past three decades (see figure 5). It 
revealed that NL MARSOF conducted missions that varied by geographic and 
political domain. I expected this, given the nature of the original taskings 
The source of the combined 
unit’s friction points was an 
overall lack of confidence.
Figure 5: Three-dimensional Comparative 
View of SOF Roles and Mission
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of the MSO and the UIM. More interestingly, it also indicated that all the 
special operations the group has undertaken took place on the direct action 
side of the spectrum of special operations. 
Figure 5 also illustrates the historical mission set of NL MARSOF in com-
parison to Dutch Army SOF (KCT). There is a large overlap in some mission 
dimensions between the two forces, but a gap in potential indirect missions. 
These observed overlaps and gaps beg the question of whether a more 
efficient division of tasks would expand the strategic utility of Dutch SOF 
overall. Recent heavy budget cuts for the Dutch Defence Forces make the 
answer to this question even more vital. 
Whether NL MARSOF needs to focus more on indirect missions depends on 
what is actually required of it. My analysis of policy documents, studies, and 
doctrine identified exactly such a requirement. By passing all this informa-
tion to NL MARSOF command, it now had the means to determine whether, 
and possibly where, it needed to adjust its vision for the way ahead.  
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.
In my experience, clearly identifying the problem for all players involved, 
like doing the mission analysis in military planning, is the single most 
important step towards solving it. A problem that remains vague and/or 
intangible not only leaves room for misinterpretation, but also for denial. 
This is especially true in the case of “soft” problems like unit culture or 
strategic direction. These aspects of organizations are not easily measured in 
numbers, budgets, or other performance metrics and therefore are harder to 
manage. This was voiced by a staff officer of NL MARSOF who said during an 
interview: “We all know that something is wrong, but we can’t quite put our 
finger on it. So, we just press on.” Tools like the Denison model help com-
manders visualize the “soft” aspects of the unit and thus make its problems 
more concrete, which instantly makes them more manageable. 
A fish stinks from the head down. 
Success requires leadership. Every military unit needs a clear and compelling 
vision to direct its efforts and actions—that proverbial dot on the horizon 
where you want to go as an organization. My research revealed that most 
members of NL MARSOF felt the organization lacked such leadership. One 
statement by an interviewee nicely captured this feeling: “MARSOF is like a 
big powerboat, but without a steering wheel.” The men needed the boss to 
take the wheel and steer the organizational powerboat in the right direction, 
and to clearly communicate his vision to the rest of the crew so they could 
work toward a common goal.  
To win the commitment of its personnel to the organization’s strategic 
goals, I advised the command to get them involved in determining “the 
way ahead.” The command therefore initiated a strategy session for selected 
senior staff officers, to formulate a coherent vision and strategic direction for 
NL MARSOF. This was followed by larger group workshops, to develop more 
support within NL MARSOF for the intended strategic direction. The mere 
fact that everyone was listened to during these workshops ultimately im-
proved understanding and commitment to the organization’s new roadmap. 
A problem that remains 
vague … leaves room for 
misinterpretation and denial.
The men needed the boss to 
take the wheel and steer.
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Are you “badged?”  
The difficulties within NL MARSOF underscore the importance of unit 
culture, especially for those who are expected to take pride in their work. 
We can have the perfect organizational structure, the latest gear, and all the 
funding, but what is most important is that people feel part of the unit and 
believe in its goals. 
Although the members of NL MARSOF did not think they shared a common 
mindset, when I asked everybody to choose the most important four out of 
sixteen possible core values and then rank those four, eighty percent valued 
quality the most. Seeing that UIM and MSO personnel shared a common 
value system was an eye-opener for most. It meant that the cultural differ-
ences that bothered everyone were at the more superficial level of symbols 
and traditions, which fortunately are easier to amend. 
For NL MARSOF, as it happened, the most important symbol of all was 
utterly lacking—the unit badge. One comment captured the frustration of 
a lot of people: “[The command] asks me take off my frogman badge for NL 
MARSOF, but does not offer anything in return!” Therefore, one of the first 
priorities after my results were digested was to create a new unit emblem, 
and the much-desired badge for the dress-blue uniform of members who 
passed the new selection course, the so called “badged” guys. Though it 
might seem a small thing to outsiders, this recognition is vital to shaping 
identity and stimulating esprit-de-corps in elite units.  
Personal Takeaways
I found this study, which I did to benefit my community, to be both mean-
ingful and rewarding, and I hope my experiences can help others who might 
be facing a similar task. During the course of my work for NL MARSOF, I 
wrote down a few key takeaways, things I found helpful. 
7P’s: Proper Planning and Preparation Prevent Piss-poor 
Performance 
This salty British military adage has proven its worth to me once more. 
I would even say that for me, as a former member of the MARSOF com-
munity, good preparation was especially important. My peers expected me 
to be on top of things when I returned to the unit’s home base. Talking to 
the guys again gave me the warm feeling of a reunion, but they never let 
me forget that they also expected me to have a solid plan to solve the issues 
at hand. I must admit their expectations caught me off guard at our first 
meeting. I made sure I was “up to speed” and had a detailed plan ready for 
our second meeting. 
Also, I would advise anybody to think ahead about follow-up possibilities. If 
others can easily build on your work, it makes it all the more valuable. In my 
case, the command committed to administer a follow-up survey after two 
years, using the same models and procedures I used, to see whether there 
One of the first priorities… 
was to create the much-
desired badge.
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have been improvements. Whoever is tasked to do this will already have the 
tools at hand to take a second “snapshot” of NL MARSOF.
Bring Something New to the Table 
If the problem being examined was simple, it probably would already have 
been solved. I advise anyone tasked with this kind of research not to be too 
wedded to his initial assumptions and solutions. When pitching a plan, you 
don’t want your audience to be thinking, “Here we go again… Been there, 
done that, not doing it again.” Take the time to find out what ideas and 
plans have been tried and abandoned, ideally from those who had to imple-
ment them. This can give you a good sense of what might be of real interest 
to the whole community, and thus can help win their cooperation. 
Don’t Reinvent the Wheel, Customize it 
Even though creativity is an important quality in special operations per-
sonnel, I believe that it is better to steal something good than to invent 
something bad. Researchers have been studying organizational culture since 
the early nineteen-eighties, and have already developed and tested good 
models and tools for others to use. The Denison model I chose was success-
fully used by more than a thousand other organizations worldwide. That 
fact alone gave it instant credibility among senior staff. The downside of 
any off-the-shelf model or tool is that it is standardized for a wide variety of 
organizations. So, when possible, customize it without losing the integrity of 
the model. In my case, I augmented the sixty DOCS-supplied questions with 
questions specific to the issues within NL MARSOF. This turned out to be a 
huge selling point of the research, because now everyone knew I used a tool 
that was battle-tested, but also fitted to the exact problem set.
Make it Worthwhile for Everyone, Not Just the Boss 
I firmly believe that the researcher 
needs to motivate and commit people 
to the project as early in the process 
as possible. Without this, he will get 
information that is flawed, which 
means the findings are going to be 
flawed as well. Even if the findings are 
solid, chances are that nobody will do 
anything with them. So, the best advice 
I can offer is to use all your personal 
skills to inspire people and make the 
research plan compelling to them. Take 
the time to build a comprehensive 
research plan, communicate it in 
person, and then reveal the findings as 
thoughtfully and tactfully as you can. 
Equally important, be open to honest 
feedback. I was fortunate to find an 
honest broker within NL MARSOF 
If the problem was simple, it 
probably would already have 
been solved.
It is better to steal 
something good than to 
invent something bad.
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M-Squadron hostage rescue exercise on Amsterdam International Airport
whom I could ask, “What’s in it for them?” His 
answers were indispensable to my process of self-
evaluation.  If his comment was unsatisfactory, I 
knew I had to adjust.
Know How to Brief Executives 
I will never again underestimate the power of execu-
tive briefs. Ultimately, the executives are the big 
dogs, so they need to be convinced foremost of any 
plan or finding. As in anything, first impressions 
last, so the impression you make has to count. If, 
like me, you’re not one of those types who can sell a 
drink to a drowning man, polish your presentation 
skills on friends who will give you honest feedback. 
General Staff officers’ agendas are very dynamic, 
and an opportunity to brief is likely to come when 
you least expect it. I got bumped from agendas 
more than once, because of more urgent matters 
elsewhere. Therefore, I made sure I always had one 
short and sharp brief ready to go at a moment’s 
notice. When the chance does arrive to brief the 
commander, one sure sign of success is to realize, 
after having been slotted in for fifteen minutes, 
that you’ve been talking for more than an hour. 
Then you know you have the boss’s ear. That is the 
moment when perseverance makes all the difference 
to overall success. In my experience, that moment 
was almost as thrilling as successfully completing a 
combat mission. 
Don’t be Too Academic
A researcher who comes from the unit needs to 
exploit the fact that he really knows the unit and 
the people working there. They are interested in 
practical solutions, not the theory behind them. 
Compared to academics or consultants, this is 
actually the single most important advantage you’ll 
have. Most of the senior members of NL MARSOF 
already had a pretty good idea of who I was, so in 
any case it was useless for me to act otherwise. If 
you come from the community you’re researching, 
chances are this will be the same for you. 
Be Sure Everybody Knows the Big Boss 
Supports You 
When you succeed in building commitment to your 
research, you will get truthful, valuable information. 
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NLMARSOF operators fast roping on vessel in the Horn of Africa
However, this information will most likely also be very critical of both spe-
cific aspects and certain high-ranking members. In the case of NL MARSOF, I 
took this to be a positive outcome, because it meant the men were not afraid 
to give me their straightforward opinions. They trusted my neutral stance. It 
is vital not to betray that level of trust by sugar-coating the findings in brief-
ings, even if it means stepping on some toes. When even tact is not enough 
to keep some people from pulling rank, the visible support of a powerful, 
high-ranking sponsor is important. In the military system, rank counts. The 
fact that most of the command staff knew my sponsor was supporting the 
research also helped elevate the status of my findings.  
Think of It as “Door-kicking” on the Executive Level.
I would assume that most soldiers don’t consider research the sexiest job 
in the world. Most would rather operate down range where the action is, 
kicking in doors to take out bad guys. I know I certainly do. Nevertheless, 
looking back I found it all very worthwhile. It is not often that one gets the 
opportunity to truly help one’s community for the long term. Considerable 
organizational changes and improvements, based partly on my findings, are 
being implemented within NL MARSOF even as I write. All in all, what I 
learned is that someone conducting this type of research actually can help 
shape the future direction of his unit. Even though this still may not be 
as sexy as kicking in doors to take out bad guys, I would argue it’s just as 
rewarding.  
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The Civilian Casualties Management Team: A Piece  
of the Counterinsurgency Puzzle
In counterinsurgencies, few events shape the perception of the 
legitimacy of military operations as powerfully as those that cause civilian ca-
sualties. Civilian leaders and populaces, informed by round-the-clock media, 
are increasingly intolerant of harm to civilians, and such events directly affect 
what is recognized as the “information environment,” a critical component 
of overseas operations. Recent restrictions on airstrikes in Afghanistan under-
score this issue and, as one journalist writes, “civilian casualties have risen 
from a public irritant to a potential roadblock in the U.S.–Afghan strategic 
partnership.”1 In this light, the subject of how to minimize and deal with 
civilian casualties in a war zone merits consideration.
This article proposes an organizational structure that can more effectively 
prevent and mitigate civilian casualties, and decrease the negative effects 
such incidents can have on counterinsurgency efforts, including Operation 
Enduring Freedom. The proposed structure does not require additional per-
sonnel, but rather allocates, coordinates, and focuses tasks already assigned 
to Brigade Combat Teams when they are deployed. This structure, called 
a Civilian Casualty Management Team (CMT), is based primarily on Civil 
Affairs Teams, but also includes message coordination capabilities, a critical 
element considering the reach of globalized media. 
As proposed here, the CMT would be a battalion-level, networked team 
whose role is to address legitimate grievances over civilian casualties at the 
local level. Civil Affairs Teams now working in Afghanistan typically consist 
of three soldiers (two enlisted and one officer) who assist in development 
and reconstruction efforts. These teams are usually assigned to a battalion in 
conventional operations, but also are considered special operations and often 
work with Special Forces. Additional capabilities would allow Civil Affairs 
Teams to act as “case managers” of civilian casualty incidents, and to network 
with the CMTs of other battalions. To be effective, these networks should be 
multifunctional and operate both defensively to mitigate civilian casualties, 
and offensively to respond to casualties caused by insurgents. In the latter 
event, CMTs could potentially use insurgents’ violence against civilians to 
win local allegiance, through initiatives tailored to specific locations and 
situations. Such initiatives could have operational and potentially strategic 
relevance in the larger counterinsurgency effort. 
This article first concentrates on the importance of civilian casualty manage-
ment, and explains the need for quick and accurate information dissemina-
tion. It describes how counterinsurgency goals can be enhanced through 
offensive and defensive information operations. The second section briefly 
discusses the training of the CMT. The article concludes by detailing the ad-
vantages CMTs could provide commanders who have to deal with the deleterious 
effects civilian casualties have on their ability to carry out their mission. 
Nate Moir
The CMT would … address 
legitimate grievances over 
civilian casualties at the local 
level.
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Civilian Casualties:  As Much an Enemy as Insurgents
Due to the news media’s increased access to the battlefield, and the speed at 
which information now spreads across the world, civilian casualties at the 
local level can significantly influence the perceptions of international audi-
ences. Such influence can be seen in the ongoing public debates concerning 
military operations that have harmed civilians in Afghanistan. The problem 
is made worse by the demands of the 24/7 news cycle, and the ability to 
spread a sensational story across the internet before anyone has checked the 
facts. These are among the factors that make the contemporary operating 
environment more complex than battlefields of the past.2 
Much has been made of counterinsurgency as a “war of perceptions.” In 
this type of conflict, international public opinion affects policy formulation 
and execution.3 For example, escalation-of-force and rules-of engagement 
procedures often are contingent on operational and strategic considerations 
that include the prevention of civilian casualties. More importantly however, 
preventing civilian casualties is about gaining local populations’ trust and 
ensuring their security, so that they can receive basic services and re-establish 
local government based on rule of law. To achieve these goals, perceptions 
play a particularly important role in counterinsurgency operations, where 
competing ideological narratives are reflected in tactical actions and strategic 
decisions. Notably, preventing or reducing civilian casualties may determine 
whether the public views a military operation as successful or not, as many 
cases in military history illustrate.4 
Civilian casualties in Afghanistan also exemplify what David Kilcullen 
termed the “theory of competitive control,” in that they powerfully embody 
the ongoing contest of narratives.5 Similarly, John Arquilla stresses the 
strategic importance of controlling and preventing such incidents: “‘Col-
lateral damage’ may be a convenient euphemism, but the real-world effect of 
killing the wrong people is to spark blood feuds, energize enemy recruitment 
and, in a case of war contagion, raise the risk of setting off a social revolu-
tion in Pakistan.”6 For future counterinsurgency forces sent to operate in an 
already unstable region, where grievances regularly lead to violence, this is an 
endemic problem that must be addressed. 
Kilcullen’s theory is further echoed in a report published by the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which notes that in 2010, 70 per-
cent of civilian casualties were caused by insurgents.7 What does this statistic 
indicate regarding the Afghan populace’s support for radical insurgents such 
as al Qaeda, who intimidate and threaten local fighters into battle in support 
of the group’s transnational ambitions? And how can this information be 
used by counterinsurgency forces to hang the proverbial “millstone” of public 
wrath around the necks of insurgents?8 
CMTs, as proposed here, could answer both of these questions. First, by 
working defensively to mitigate civilian casualties, they can at the very least 
prevent harm and alleviate grievances. Lessening the number and severity 
of civilian casualties accomplishes three important tasks: 1) it helps reduce 
the impact on locals, which is the right thing to do in every sense; 2) it can 
provide a “backstop” of goodwill to help retain support among the affected 
Much has been made of 
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populace; and 3) it potentially contributes to latent offensive informa-
tion operations opportunities. The second question, how to turn the high 
percentage of civilian casualties caused by insurgents into an information 
offensive, is addressed below. 
Offensive Information Operations
When civilian casualties are caused by foreign insurgents such as al Qaeda, 
the CMT may help convince low-level, local fighters to distance themselves 
from transnational terrorists by driving home the fact that such terrorists 
are a primary source of civilian deaths in the fighters’ own communities. 
This information could lead to a partial disruption of the cycle of fear and 
intimidation radicals often impose on locals. It is worth noting that Afghan 
communities resent being manipulated by any group; after decades of 
warfare, they primarily want to be left alone.9
Insurgent groups, however, try to manipulate grievances, both real and 
perceived, in those communities. They also take advantage of the culture 
of Pashtunwali, which can be briefly described as an unwritten code of 
sociocultural practices that predates Islam in the region. It guides many of 
the tribal cultural traits of Pashtuns, including hospitality (melmastia), honor 
(nang), and revenge (badal). Counterinsurgent forces should try to honor the 
codes of Pashtunwali by focusing every possible effort on mitigating civilian 
casualties, especially when insurgents are the cause. Maintaining and em-
phasizing ethical behavior, and deliberately contrasting that ethical behavior 
with the actions of insurgent groups, may help advance strategic goals by 
turning terrorists’ brutality on themselves and setting “accidental guerrillas” 
(as Kilcullen calls them) against those who manipulate them.10 
The development of CMTs could help achieve both these goals. When 
civilian casualties occur, the CMT could be deployed to the scene as a type 
of “first responder.” Currently, Civil Affairs Teams are often tasked with this 
job, but are not always given adequate resources to fully perform it. Because 
the CMT would essentially be a Civil Affairs Team developed specifically for 
this purpose, it would be tactically located and supported within the area, as 
well as properly equipped and trained to manage incidents involving civilian 
casualties. In addition to the humanitarian response, the CMT could poten-
tially assist in separating transnational radical groups from local, low-level 
Taliban fighters, who do not necessarily support the extremists’ goals. These 
outside groups provide only local support to insurgents, but when they are 
connected across districts and provinces, cumulatively provide an important 
base for terrorist activities. In counterinsurgencies, there are few and fleeting 
opportunities to separate outside insurgent groups from the local population; 
effective mitigation of civilian casualties is one way to pursue these openings.
In The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen describes how local, low-level fighters 
are intimidated or manipulated into serving causes that go beyond locally 
focused goals, through what he terms the “accidental guerrilla syndrome.”11  
Civilian casualties are an important piece of this process because insurgents 
regularly stage violence, and then publicly blame coalition forces for any 
deaths. Insurgent groups will brutalize and intimidate locals who are not 
necessarily interested in the insurgent cause, in an effort to coerce them into 
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providing support. This exploitation is often key to the insurgents’ manipu-
lation of local populations, and offers an opportunity for counterinsurgency 
teams to win over local support by providing reliable assistance.12
Kilcullen further suggests that al Qaeda is 
seeking to create a global insurgency through 
aggregates of localized insurgencies, which 
are primarily formed through exploiting the 
accidental guerrilla syndrome.13 When people 
are co-opted and intimidated by terrorists into 
joining the insurgency at the local level, their 
actions can prompt a heavy-handed interven-
tion by counterinsurgent forces. That interven-
tion then creates a secondary backlash against the 
counterinsurgent forces. The model in figure 1 
illustrates this process.
In the proposal put forth in this article, the 
CMT could disrupt the accidental guerrilla 
syndrome by intervening between the “conta-
gion” and “rejection” phases, when counterin-
surgency forces are actively engaging the guerrillas. By stepping in at these 
times, the CMT could prevent local grievances over civilian casualties from 
being manipulated by insurgent groups, and prevent or lessen the effects 
of any further incidents. Such interventions could potentially prevent local 
fighters from becoming “infected” by terrorist efforts to manipulate them into 
becoming accomplices to transnational terrorist goals. 
The syndrome could be further derailed through the quick and thorough 
resolution of incidents of civilian casualties that have been caused by insur-
gents. To do so, the CMTs must use information operations to expose the 
criminal intent of the insurgents’ actions.15 If locals can be coerced into 
serving terrorists’ goals, then it follows that reversing the process (by turning 
locals against terrorists through mitigation efforts) can achieve the opposite 
goal of increasing support for counterinsurgency. This is not being accom-
plished at least in part because local grievances over civilian casualties are 
not dealt with as systematically and effectively as possible. There currently 
are insufficient information operations resources and personnel to complete 
what are highly significant tasks. Although civilian casualties are not the only 
vulnerability exploited by terrorist groups, local grievances play an important 
role in terrorist and insurgent calculations. One aspect of counterinsurgent 
efforts therefore must be to help local Afghans see more clearly that insur-
gent groups often have nothing positive to offer them. 
In sum, if the CMTs could mitigate local incidences of civilian casualties, 
these seemingly small-scale approaches could potentially accomplish much 
more by turning the accidental guerrilla syndrome on itself, and using the 
same principle in reverse to set the local populations against the terrorists. 
Thus, an underlying goal for mitigating civilian casualties would be to 
make local, low-level fighters part of this specific recovery process in the 
short term, and perhaps get them into the Afghan Peace and Reintegra-
tion Program in the long term. Resolving civilian casualty incidents at the 
CMTs must use information 
operations to expose 
the criminal intent of the 
insurgents’ actions.
Figure 1:  Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome14
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community level, regardless of their causes, has the potential to exert a 
powerful influence within Afghan culture.16
The Civilian Casualty Management Team: Structure  
and Training
The proposed CMT would play a crucial role in the defensive handling of 
incidents involving civilian casualties caused by coalition forces. Despite the 
guidance laid out in SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) 307, Edition 2, 
current procedures lack coordination and unity. There is no organization 
specifically trained and tasked to deal with civilian casualties, thus every 
Brigade Combat Team approaches these complex events differently, and with 
various capabilities. CMTs would be specifically designed and trained to fill 
that gap. This small, networked team of professionals would more effectively 
address local grievances, and could also increase inter-agency coordination, 
if members were trained and given the network capabilities to do so prior to 
deployment. As discussed earlier, controlling the information environment is 
a vital aspect of success in counterinsurgency operations.
Information is the base for the pillars of security, governance, and develop-
ment. In order to more effectively manage civilian casualty incidents, which 
have the potential to affect multiple levels of command, the CMT would have 
characteristics that reduce the impact of pitfalls such as stove-piping and other 
common disconnects between levels of command. These obstacles to efficiency 
are important to identify and correct. “We need to create ‘unity of effort’ at 
best, and collaboration or de-confliction at least. This depends less on a shared 
command-control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem, 
platforms for collaboration, information sharing and de-confliction.”17 How 
would a CMT be structured to address civilian casualties more effectively? 
Structure
The CMT organizational structure would be based on Civil Affairs Teams, 
which typically consist of three personnel and are led by an officer (usually a 
Captain/0-3). Civil Affairs Teams are ideally suited to become the nucleus for 
the CMT concept because they are located at the battalion level. The team’s 
skills, training, and familiarity with such procedures as the Commander’s 
Insurgency Response Program, condolence payments for losses, and solatia 
(solace) payments for emotional distress also make it a logical platform on 
which to build the CMT.18
CMT members would serve as “case managers” of events involving civilian 
casualties, and become the primary point of contact from the initial report 
of deaths to the event’s resolution. This will require them to receive a module 
of additional skills training and improved access to resources that will assist 
them in dealing with civilian deaths. A CMT certification program, and the 
reconfiguration of Civil Affairs Teams into networks trained to work with other 
CMTs and aid organizations would enable CMTs to oversee multiple staff func-
tions as they pertain to civilian casualties. Overall, CMTs could achieve a more 
unified effort because they would be structured as a networked collaboration to a 
greater degree than the system that currently exists. 
There is no organization 
specifically trained and tasked 
to deal with civilian casualties.
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The implementation of this Civilian Casualties Management Team proposal 
consists of three main steps:
 ¡ Utilize the 3-person Civil Affairs Team model as the primary structure;
 ¡ Incorporate training and subject-matter expertise from relevant staff 
sections, such as public affairs, legal, information operations, military 
information support operations (formerly called PSYOP), etc.;
 ¡ Augment as needed and directed by the brigade commander/BCT S3.
Training
The following section of this proposal outlines the additional skills and 
resources required for Civil Affairs Teams in order to create CMTs capable 
of more effectively managing incidents involving civilian casualties. Because 
every such incident is unique, training prior to deployment should focus 
on coordinating additional resources to address these specific incidents. 
Trainers would draw from sources that include Information Operations, 
Military Information Support Operations, Medical Operations, the Judge 
Advocate General, and Public Affairs. Additional training and resources 
might be provided by human terrain teams, red teams, religious personnel 
(chaplains and mullahs, contingent on the operating environment), and 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which provides a 
critical, long-term resource through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program 
(ACAP). This program would be an integral component of the CMTs, and 
exemplifies how the teams may better unify efforts between the military and 
other agencies. Beyond the current conflict, the development of the CMT 
concept is relevant to any contingency operation. In the case of Afghanistan, 
CMTs could support coalition efforts to improve efficiency as troop numbers 
draw down.
Civil Affairs.
Civil Affairs Teams possess skills in civil-military relations, and consistently 
develop partnerships with district officials, local community representatives, 
provincial governors (in some cases), Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Agricul-
tural Development Teams, and Afghan Security Forces. Further, as mentioned 
earlier, these teams are already familiar with the outreach processes involving 
affidavits, sworn statements, and authorizing and disbursing funds. They have op-
portunities to interact with USAID and other aid organizations, such as the Islamic 
Relief Organization or Afghan Red Crescent Society. These contacts, skills, and 
capabilities make the Civil Affair Teams the ideal platform for additional training 
to qualify them as Civilian Casualty Management Teams.
Information Operations and Military Information Support Operations.
Information Operations and Military Information Support Operations 
are responsible for disseminating information to local populations. In this 
proposal, these detachments would provide the CMT with information on 
the technical, cultural, and contextual aspects of specific cases, and assist the 
CMT by providing pertinent media resources. For example, after an incident 
involving civilian casualties, the CMT would be deployed by the commander 
to the location. One of the team’s first tasks would be to decide what method 
should be used by Information Operations to report the incident to the 
community. Should it be by radio-in-a-box (a portable broadcasting system 
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for remote locations), face-to-face engagement, handbills, or some other 
method? Because the CMT, as the initial responder and case manager, would 
have received training for such circumstances, it could more effectively 
advise the information personnel. 
This is important, because Information Operations is a staff function, and 
teams of personnel cannot be deployed to directly manage the information 
environment from the location of the incident. A Military Information 
Support Operations team assigned to the area might be tasked with this 
responsibility, but these teams do not have the same skill sets that Civil 
Affairs Teams possess. What is needed is a team with the specific capabilities 
of both. Although Civil Affairs Teams are a battalion-level capability, the 
cross-training the CMT members would receive in Information Operations 
would help alleviate coordination problems. CMT members would have the 
knowledge to make better use of Military Information Support Operations 
and their resources, which include public address systems and dedicated 
interpreters. These information teams could in turn support the CMT with 
cultural awareness and consequence management skills to help engage the 
local populace, which is important for regaining people’s trust after a tragedy 
and informing them about what will be done to resolve the situation.19
As many commanders know, civilian casualties can set off a powder keg of 
anger and frustration, regardless of their cause. To be effective, mitigation 
preparations must be made ahead of time. If CMTs are already trained in 
culturally astute consequence management, and to incorporate and coor-
dinate battalion and Brigade Combat Team resources fluidly, these teams 
would greatly improve the likelihood of resolving the casualty situations 
satisfactorily for all sides. Notably, maneuver unit leaders, such as platoon 
leaders and company commanders, must maintain overall control and 
manage the security of the situation at hand. If they are able to work with a 
well-trained CMT in managing a specific casualty incident, starting with the 
initial meeting that typically follows such an event, it significantly increases the 
commanders’ overall ability to manage the larger, evolving tactical concerns. 
Judge Advocate General (JAG).
JAG training would include basic legal awareness of relevant issues as they 
pertain to handling civilian casualties at the unit and individual levels. 
Clearly defined guidance for units may be channeled from the JAG through 
the CMT to help clarify legal limits, although CMT personnel would not be 
lawyers and must not provide legal advice. They would, however, be able to 
assist the JAG in making sure Afghan government and International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) legal guidelines are followed for casualty incidents. 
This would also help prevent infractions, or the spread of information that 
could legally implicate a unit or individual. 
Religious support personnel.
In Islamic-based tribal societies, proper religious observances for the injured 
and deceased are imperative. This is particularly true in societies where 
unwritten codes such as Pashtunwali play a major part in how violent events 
are resolved or, alternately, create a cycle of revenge. For example, if a CMT 
has previously established contact with a mullah who is accepted within a 
community and by the locally-based Afghan National Security Forces, this 
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mullah could be brought in to help the injured or to respectfully recover 
the bodies of those killed. Further, such pre-coordination would positively 
affect the development of the public message as described above. These 
coordinated efforts to effectively deal with civilian casualties as grievances 
(or determine whether grievances are legitimate) would also make it more 
difficult for the incident to be manipulated by outside insurgent groups.
Public Affairs.
The initial reports Public Affairs officials receive of civilian casualties are 
often inaccurate and confusing. These personnel nevertheless work to 
quickly and accurately provide basic information to media sources that 
sometimes know about violent incidents before higher levels of command 
do. While all public statements must be vetted and coordinated with Public 
Affairs at the brigade level, and in conjunction with Information Opera-
tions, providing CMTs with public affairs training and guidance may do 
much to defuse a difficult situation and prevent media sources from gleaning 
inaccurate or incriminating information from inexperienced soldiers. CMTs 
would assist and help coordinate the work of Public Affairs representatives, 
in a way similar to how they would work with Military Information Support 
Operations teams, to prevent events from being announced to the world in 
an uncoordinated and inaccurate manner.
USAID.
For communities, families, and individuals affected by civilian casualties, 
being connected with the USAID Afghan Civilian Assistance Program is 
important for the successful resolution of such tragic events over the long-
term. The CMT’s task would be to coordinate the initial implementation 
of this program, and eventually transfer assistance requirements over to 
USAID, which is the agency responsible for long-term aid commitments to 
Afghans. Although the CMT would not conduct the work of the program, 
team members would act as facilitators. Currently, this initial link between 
recipient and provider is inconsistent because security concerns often prevent 
USAID personnel from reaching the location or connecting with individuals 
or communities affected by these events. Utilizing the CMT to establish that 
initial connection could alleviate that problem. 
As set out in USAID guidance: 
…[ACAP] provides support for Afghan civilian families and 
communities that have suffered losses as a result of military 
operations between coalition forces and insurgents. ACAP pro-
vides sustainable assistance directly to families including one 
or more of the following components: small business start-up, 
vocational training, literacy training for adults, education sup-
port for school-age children, home repair and reconstruction, 
restoring livelihood sources, and rebuilding vital community 
infrastructure.20 
Judicious use of this assistance program may augment and reinforce the 
intent behind condolence disbursements. Furthermore, it is an opportunity 
to mitigate the negative effects of civilian casualties, especially when a family 
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has lost its income-provider, by providing a sustained flow of resources; this 
also is consistent with long-term counterinsurgency strategies. 
CMT Certification: Recommendations and Conclusion
The CMT, based on the concept of augmenting Civil Affairs Teams through 
the skills described above, should be a robust and capable organization that 
would be deployed by the battalion commander to events involving civilian 
casualties. All alleged incidents must be handled seriously, and the proposed 
CMT can be a tool for ensuring that guidance is properly implemented 
beginning with the initial event.21 To ensure skills are fully augmented and 
delivered uniformly, the CMT should be certified through implementation of 
an additional skill identifier.
Because it synthesizes multiple staff elements and skills, the CMT organiza-
tional structure warrants such certification. This additional skill identifier 
would also reassure battalion commanders that CMTs are equipped with the 
knowledge, ability, and skills to unify capabilities at Brigade Combat Team 
and battalion levels, and that CMTs may effectively mitigate and manage 
civilian casualty incidents. Certification could possibly include the develop-
ment and implementation of a series of battle drills in real-world scenarios, 
such as a small-scale version of the Ft. Polk Joint Readiness Training Center 
or the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, in the United States. Further, 
such battle drills could be part of Brigade Combat Team deployment valida-
tion training during rotations at Ft. Polk and Ft. Irwin. 
The ISAF Civilian Casualties Handling Procedures handbook details the 
numerous reports required and steps that must be taken to achieve the Com-
mander of ISAF’s intent.22 ISAF SOP 307, Edition 2 is a highly complex and 
important process to execute downrange. That being said, the most impor-
tant recommendation regarding the CMT is that it must be implemented 
before a deployment. To achieve this, detailed instruction and procedural 
familiarity with SOP 307, Edition 2’s guidance would be a capstone element 
of the additional skill identifier certification discussed above. 
The certified CMT would thus become an important resource to ensure a 
unified effort when dealing with civilian casualties. This capability could 
greatly improve counterinsurgency forces’ ability to handle civilian casual-
ties in a timely manner, and enable them to more effectively communicate 
with locals affected by the incidents, the media, and civilian leadership. As a 
result, it also would be an important step toward more effective counterin-
surgency operations.  
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History cannot give us a program for the future, but it can give 
us a fuller understanding of ourselves, and of our common 
humanity, so that we can better face the future.
 —Robert Penn Warren
As long as military units have taken prisoners in wartime, captors 
have agonized over how to entice or force their prisoners to share what they 
know. Often the default has been to use torture. Recent history has shown, 
however, that although torture may get prisoners to talk, there is no guaran-
tee that what they say is the truth. This article introduces two highly suc-
cessful interrogators from World War II who explicitly rejected torture, and 
explores the methods they used to get vital information from prisoners. 
Many military units, particularly Special Operations Forces and air crews, 
receive some sort of training on survival, evasion, resistance against inter-
rogation, and escape (known as SERE) techniques. The training on resisting 
an enemy’s interrogation techniques is designed to make trainees aware of 
the various potential interrogation methods that could be used against them. 
Thus, participants in the training actually experience coercive and often 
illegal—by Geneva Convention standards—treatments, such as being forced 
into so-called “stress positions” (e.g., forced to stand in one place for hours, 
or to stand leaning against a wall, or to kneel with hands over the head), suf-
fering through acts of personal humiliation, and being denied food or proper 
sleep. In addition, thousands of soldiers have been waterboarded during SERE 
training.1 Some controversial reports have claimed that soldiers in Afghani-
stan, Iraq, and elsewhere have used the methods they were exposed to during 
SERE training when interrogating captured insurgents. 
The history of interrogation used in warfare can provide a clear picture of 
the effectiveness of various interrogation methods. This article describes the 
methods used by two very different men, Hanns Joachim Scharff and Sher-
wood Ford Moran, who were among the most effective interrogators during 
the Second World War. It begins with descriptions of Scharff and Moran, 
who they were, and the techniques they so effectively used. It then compares 
and contrasts the two men’s methodologies, and offers some insights into 
why they both had such success despite their differences. 
While this article does not discuss torture directly, it can contribute to the 
ongoing discussion of this difficult subject, and help soldiers deployed to 
conflict zones gain a better understanding and knowledge of successful, legal 
interrogation procedures. 
Learning From History:  What Is Successful Interrogation?
LTC Ronny Kristoffersen, RNN
CTX | Vol. 2, No. 3
30
Hanns Joachim Scharff
I obtained all the necessary information from over 90% of the 
prisoners.
 —Hanns J. Scharff
Hanns Joachim Scharff was born in 1907 in East Prussia. 
His father, Hanns-Hermann Scharff, was an army officer 
who left the military to join his father-in-law as a partner 
in a textile factory in Greiz, south of Leipzig, Germany.2 
The Scharff family lived at Villa Jahn in Greiz, and 
Scharff began formal training in textiles when he was a 
teenager.3 After several years spent learning every aspect 
of his trade, Scharff went to Johannesburg, South Africa 
to gain experience in sales, and was so successful in the 
company’s foreign office that he was promoted and stayed 
there several years before returning to Germany. 
While in South Africa, Scharff met and married Mar-
garet Stokes, a British South African with whom he 
had three children.4 The family was living back in Greiz 
when World War II started; Scharff was drafted into the 
Army and assigned to a Panzergrenadier regiment, an in-
fantry component of a Panzer division.5 After a transfer, 
Scharff became assistant to an army interrogator, and when he demonstrated 
a remarkable ability to gain the trust and cooperation of prisoners of war, 
soon became an interrogator himself. 
In his book The Interrogator, Raymond F. Toliver describes Scharff as “the 
interrogator that managed to get every pilot he questioned to give him 
the answers he had to have. In many instances, the prisoners of war being 
questioned never realized that their words, small talk or otherwise, were in 
one way or another of great value to Germany’s war machinery.”6 To the 
Americans, Scharff became known as “Poker-Face” or “Stone-Face” Scharff.
How Scharff Worked
After the war, Scharff testified on behalf of several American military men 
who stood accused of the most flagrant treason because of the information 
they disclosed to him while prisoners of war. During testimony in 1948, 
Scharff explained that the training and indoctrination the American soldiers 
received about how to behave if they were taken prisoner became very useful 
to him in his role as an interrogator. 
Scharff developed an understanding of the POW “state of mind”—what he 
called “barbed-wire psychosis,” which is a prisoner of war’s sense of guilt 
about surviving and being on the sidelines until the end of the war. He used 
that knowledge, along with his perception of how it felt to be a POW, to 
behave very differently from the way the American soldiers had been taught 
to expect.7 Instead of torturing or degrading prisoners, Scharff offered them, 
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and captured pilots in particular, courtesy and what appeared to be consid-
eration. Instead of attempting to coerce or persuade with offers of booze 
and prostitutes, Scharff and his fellow officers took prisoners to whatever 
cinema shows were available at camp, and even shared tea and coffee with 
them, when they could get it.8 Every enemy aviator the Germans captured 
was brought to Oberusel, the Luftwaffe’s interrogation and evaluation center, 
which made it easier to consolidate, control, and use the information the 
interrogators obtained.9
According to Scharff, POW interrogations should consist of three phases. 
First is to help the POW relax and feel comfortable by making small talk 
about anything at all. Second, after he’s loosened up, the questioner should 
try to get the prisoner to reveal any military information or plans that he 
might know, ideally without letting him realize he has said anything of value. 
Third, the interrogator must write an evaluation report that is truthful, and 
that contains any and all information that might be useful to commanding 
officers in the field.10
Scharff proved to be a master at “perspective taking,” the ability to discern 
the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of others, and he seemed to be able 
to enter and understand the minds of those he interrogated. These skills 
enabled him to elicit important information from prisoners without force 
or coercion.11 Furthermore, he was very good at concealing the nature of 
the information he sought, and never revealed any success or failure to his 
target. Prisoners thus often believed they had given Scharff nothing, certainly 
nothing of importance.12 
Scharff ’s Interrogation Techniques
In initial interrogations, which were handled not by Scharff but by officers 
in the primary screening room, interrogators routinely asked three questions: 
What is your name? What is your rank? What is your serial number?13 The 
prisoner was then taken back to his cell for a while. His second meeting 
would be with “Stone Face” Scharff, although the POW and Scharff might 
have met previously because Sharff often escorted prisoners to and from 
formal interrogations. 
Prisoners were often surprised by Scharff’s office and his reception, especially 
the fact that Scharff was a private, not an officer. Scharff maintained proper 
military courtesy and respect for the pilots, and he had an expert command 
of English; these were not the characteristics prisoners expected of a German 
interrogator. After receiving a prisoner, Scharff would leave him alone for 
a little while in his office, which was purposely furnished with American 
magazines, cigarettes, and posters of pin-up girls; the furnishings and decora-
tions were all designed to make a prisoner feel more “at home,” so he would 
relax and begin to lower his guard. 
When Scharrf returned, his next moves were designed to get information 
beyond a prisoner’s name, rank, and serial number. Prisoners were often 
dressed in civilian clothes, which they had put on to try to evade capture. 
Scharff would tell a prisoner he needed some proof or confirmation that the 
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man really was a pilot, not a spy, and thus entitled to treatment as a prisoner 
of war. Scharff would go on to say that if he didn’t get that confirmation, the 
prisoner might be treated as a spy. At that point, instead of making threats, 
Scharff would ask the POW to imagine how a spy might be treated. The POW 
knew a spy was likely to be shot, while a combat soldier was entitled to all 
the rights and privileges offered by the Hague and Geneva Conventions.14 
Scharff did not work alone. One of the most important people in his 
organization was Frau Biehler, who headed a bureau called BUNA-Beute und 
Nachrichten Abtilung.15 Toliver describes Biehler this way: 
She was a tireless, obliging, and proud manageress. Her knowl-
edge was paramount and with the information she and her staff 
gathered about Air Forces from all countries; units stationed in 
Africa, England, or wherever; names, medals, letters, newspaper 
clippings, identification papers forged by the French under-
ground, photographs, etc., they were able to establish where the 
POWs came from, their units, if they flew fighters or bombers, 
and type of aircraft, and other identification factors.16 
Scharff used the information that Frau Biehler and her staff provided to 
create a “we already know everything” illusion for the prisoner. Rather than 
ask questions, Sharff would proceed to tell the POW all about his unit and 
its leadership, and anecdotes about its mission, leading the POW to believe 
that Scharff knew it all. A prisoner who believes that the interrogator already 
knows everything believes he has nothing to lose by answering questions; 
since the interrogator has the answers it makes little sense to deny the 
information.17 
After Scharff had obtained the information requested by his superiors, he 
would carefully transcribe the conversations that would be of value to higher 
command and aviation staff.18 Typical information requested could include: 
“What orders are given pilots to govern bombings and strafing attacks upon 
our railroad trains? What is the significance of the shooting of ten white 
tracer bullets in quick succession during air combat? When do fighters 
discharge their belly tanks?”19
According to analyst Pär Anders Granhag, Scharff’s technique consisted of 
five basic tactics: 1) creating the “we-already-know-everything” illusion;  
2) taking a friendly approach; 3) not pressing for information; 4) confirming 
and disconfirming information; and 5) ignoring important information as 
it was obtained. “The Scharff-technique,” he concluded, “is an umbrella 
concept” involving a number of tactics, whose combination was of key im-
portance.20 Many books and manuals that have come out since the Second 
World War recognize the significance of Hanns Joachim Scharff’s interroga-
tion technique, a method which proved to be very effective. 
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Sherwood Ford Moran
I consider that since they are out of the combat for good, they 
are simply needy human beings, needing our help, physical 
and spiritual.
 —Sherwood F. Moran
Sherwood Ford Moran was born October 8, 1885, in Covington, Kentucky, 
where his father, William Joel Moran, was stationed as a clerk for the U.S. 
Army Quartermaster Corps.21 From there, the family 
moved to Flatbush, New York, where Sherwood 
Moran graduated from the Brooklyn Latin School. 
In 1911, at age 26, he enrolled in Oberlin College 
in Ohio, a parochial Congregational college, where 
Moran majored in philosophy.22 During that time, 
he had the opportunity to travel around the world as 
secretary to Sherwood Eddy, a well-known pacifist 
and founder of YMCA branches overseas, specifically 
in Asia. In 1915, Moran married Ursul Reeves, a 
woman he had met in college. They became mis-
sionaries and were sent to Tokyo, Japan, where they 
focused on setting up religious institutions; their 
three children were born in Tokyo. The Morans were 
on furlough in Boston in 1941 when the Japanese at-
tacked Pearl Harbor, and Moran quickly realized that 
his fluency in Japanese could prove very useful to the 
American military. So, at age 56, he decided to join 
the Marines, which he admired for their “style, vigor, 
discipline, and goal setting.” On August 8, 1942, 
Moran, now a senior language intelligence officer, 
was with the First Marine Division when it landed 
on Guadalcanal. 
How Moran Worked
In the study, “Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters 
Based on Work in the Field,” Moran described three 
aspects of his work that are of prime importance 
when it comes to being “an interpreter” or “inter-
viewer,” the terms he preferred over “interrogator.”23 
Moran credited his success to his character, his 
experience, and his temperament. It is from these, 
he said, that the interpreter will gradually develop 
his personal technique.24 As he described it, Moran’s 
own approach 
was built on the assumption that few if any prisoners are likely 
to possess decisive information about imminent plans. Rather, 
it is the small and seemingly inconsequential bits of evidence 
that prisoners may give away once they start talking—about 
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training, weapons, commanders, tactics—that, when assembled 
into a larger mosaic, build up the most complete and valuable 
picture of the enemy’s organization, intentions, and methods.25 
To Moran, attitude was of prime importance, and thus he often began an 
interrogation by telling the prisoner just what his attitude was: “I consider 
a prisoner (i.e., a man who has been captured and disarmed and is in a 
perfectly safe place) as out of the war, out of the picture, and thus, in a way, 
not an enemy.”26 
By “a perfectly safe place,” Moran meant that it was important for the pris-
oner to understand that there was “no hope of escape, that it is all over, and 
that they should forget the ‘enemy’ stuff, and the ‘prisoner’ stuff.” He talked 
to them simply as one human being to another.27 Furthermore, Moran con-
sidered the Japanese soldiers people to be pitied rather than hated. Speaking 
from that perspective, he would tell them “they had been led around by the 
nose by their leaders; that they do not know, and have not been allowed to 
know for over ten years what has been going on in the world,” just as in the 
saying, “The frog in the well knows nothing about the ocean.”
Another aspect of prime importance, he believed, was the “character” of the 
interrogator. He must be absolutely sincere. It was not enough to just assume 
that attitude in order to gain the prisoner’s confidence and get him to talk. 
The interrogator must by his expressions, eyes, and tone of voice convince 
the prisoner that he really saw the Japanese as humans, not enemies; and 
that he really cared for their well-being. It is in all respects “a gentleman’s 
approach.” 
One of Moran’s greatest advantages in interrogating Japanese prisoners was 
that he had lived in Japan for many years, and so he knew not only the 
language, but also the country’s culture, including such seemingly simple 
things as popular names and familiar places. “If you know anything about 
Japanese history, art, politics, athletics, famous places, department stores, 
eating places,” noted Moran, “a conversation may be relatively interminable.” 
In sum, Moran explains the characteristics of a successful interpreter this way: 
An interpreter should be a man of culture, insights, resourceful-
ness, and with real conversation ability. He must have “gags”; 
he must have a “line”; he must be alive; he must be warm; he 
must be vivid. Above all, he must have integrity and sympathy, 
yet he should be firm and wise (“wise as serpents but harmless 
as doves.”) He must have dignity and a proper sense of values, 
but should be friendly, open and frank.28 
Moran described his interrogation techniques in Guadalcanal as “slam-
bang-methods, where, right in the midst of things we had what might be 
called ‘battle-field interpretation,’ where we snatched prisoners right off 
the battlefield while still bleeding and the snipers were still sniping, and 
interviewed them as soon as they were able to talk.”29 After their battlefield 
interview, prisoners were brought to the back bases where the interviewing 
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continued. Here, more advanced, specific questions were asked, such as 
questions about the prisoner’s “submarine equipment, radar questions, range 
finders, bombsights, etc. If the interpreter did not fully master the language, 
both technical terms and a large general vocabulary, he would not make an 
effective interviewer: language was most important.” 
Moran’s Interrogation Techniques
Moran quickly learned that every soldier had a story to tell, and he believed 
the interrogator’s job was to facilitate and provide the atmosphere that 
allowed the prisoner to tell his story. He offered these tips:
Begin by asking him things about himself. Make him and his 
troubles the center of the stage, not you and your questions of 
war problems. If he is not wounded or tired out, you can ask him 
if he has been getting enough to eat. … You can ask if he has had 
cigarettes, if he is being treated all right, etc. If he is wounded 
you have a rare chance. Begin to talk about his wounds. Ask if 
the doctor or corpsman has attended to him. Have him show 
you his wounds or burns.30
Also important, Moran said, is for the interrogator to not be “too systematic 
in the questioning.” However, in the interrogator’s mind there must be a 
mode of approach: “the interrogator must know exactly what information 
he wants and come back to it repeatedly.”31 Contrary to most interrogators, 
Moran tried to create an atmosphere that downplayed the idea that the pris-
oner was in the presence of his conqueror, because that atmosphere tended 
to put the prisoner “in a psychological position of being on the defensive.”32
Another successful technique that Moran used, especially toward prisoners 
who refused to give any information except their name, rank, and serial 
number, was to shame the prisoners. To do this, he played on his knowledge 
about Japanese culture. For example he would tell a prisoner that he had 
lived in Japan for many years, had many Japanese friends, and had enjoyed 
many good and intimate conversations with them. You too could “have a 
conversation with me,” Moran would tell a difficult prisoner, “but never have 
[I] met anyone so offish and on guard as you,” even though “we have treated 
you well, far better than probably we would have been treated,” if Americans 
were taken prisoner in Japan.33 This tactic would upset and offend many 
prisoners, and they would respond by talking. In addition, Japanese cap-
tives often feared going back to their families because they felt humiliated 
and ashamed, and believed that their capture was a disappointment to their 
families.34 When they saw other Japanese prisoners, however, they often 
were relieved to find they were not alone, and would start talking.35
Moran believed that interrogator–prisoner conversations should be made 
interesting, in a way that captures the prisoner’s imagination. Questions 
should build upon each other, ending in a way that impels the prisoner to 
either tell his part of the “story” that the interviewer had started, end the 
story, or correct it because some facts were wrong.36 The primary goal of an 
interrogator’s questions is to gather pertinent information. In Moran’s case, 
Questions should…end in a 
way that impels the prisoner 
to tell his part of the “story.”
CTX | Vol. 2, No. 3
36
he needed information that would be useful to U.S. Marine Corps am-
phibious forces. Often, a prisoner was too tired or seriously wounded to be 
questioned at length. Because Moran was usually stationed on the front lines 
and his interrogations were often interrupted by bombing raids, he stuck to 
questions that dealt with imperative information, such as: 
When did you arrive at Guadalcanal? Where did you land? (Very 
important.) How many landed with you? What kind of a ship did 
you come in? (Don’t ask a leading question, such as, “Did you 
come on a warship?” ...) Ask the name of the ship. How many 
troops were on the ship? If, for instance, he says he came on a 
destroyer, ask how many troops usually travel on a destroyer. ... 
How many other ships were with yours? What kind of ships? 
Where did you sail from and when? Were there many ships in 
that harbor? When did you leave Japan? Where were you between 
the time you left Japan and the time you landed on Guadalcanal? 
When you landed were any munitions landed? Artillery? Food 
supplies, medical supplies? After you landed where did you go? 
Where were you between the time you landed and the time 
you were captured? What experience in actual combat warfare 
have you had; your company, battalion, or regiment? How is 
the present food supply in your unit? Sickness? What was the 
objective of your attack last night? ... 37
In his writings, Moran observed that an interrogator who is genuinely 
tough has the confidence to know that he will always have the advantage, 
even while being nice. “Enlightened hard-boiled-ness,” Moran called it. He 
concluded that “the most important characteristic of a successful interrogator 
is not his experience or even his linguistic knowledge; it is his own tempera-
ment and his own character.”38 
Similarities and Differences between the Two 
Interrogators 
Despite coming from opposite sides of a terrible war, an analysis of the inter-
rogation techniques Hanns Scharff and Sherwood Moran used reveals more 
similarities than differences. Some of the differences between the two men’s 
techniques were determined by the differences in the circumstances and 
the settings of the interrogations. Scharff was located outside the battlefield 
environment, in Oberusel, the famous Luftwaffe Interrogation and Evalua-
tion Center, while Moran worked on the front lines, under palm trees, while 
enduring continual bombing raids. Therefore, Scharff had much more time 
to carry out his interrogations, and also had the opportunity to interrogate 
prisoners several times. Moreover, Moran often needed to obtain “time 
critical” information that might reveal the next ambush, number of enemies 
in the area, conditions of enemy units—tactical information that could im-
mediately help the Marines in the field. He knew that the prisoners, because 
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In contrast, because he was not with troops in the field, Scharff tried to get 
more general strategic information. His questions pointed toward gaining 
some larger understanding of the enemy and its tactics as a whole. Scharff, 
like his American counterpart, also assumed that prisoners would not have 
information about imminent plans. 
Moran’s questions, because of a lack of time and because the prisoners were 
often tired or wounded, had to be direct, whereas Scharff could spend more 
time talking all around a question, thereby concealing the nature of the infor-
mation he was actually seeking. Indeed, many prisoners later said that they 
never knew what information Scharff was after, but they were confident they 
had not given him anything valuable, even when, as it turned out, they had.
Perhaps the greatest difference between Scharff’s and Moran’s experiences as 
interrogators was that Scharff, who was interrogating mostly American or 
British combatants, had a large intelligence apparatus to work with. Frau 
Biehler in the BUNA Bureau, for example, provided Scharff with the back-
ground information that made it possible for him to create a “we-already-
know-everything” illusion.39 Moran, who was interrogating Japanese soldiers 
on the battlefield, had only the intelligence he and the others with him were 
able to gather. Nonetheless, Moran had the advantage of being able to draw 
on his personal knowledge of Japanese culture, names, places, and customs 
to create a bond with—or manipulate—prisoners, and get the information 
he needed.
Both Moran and Scharff based their approaches on the assumption that few, 
if any, prisoners were likely to possess decisive information about imminent 
plans. More important, both men viewed the prisoners more as human 
beings than as enemies. Because both Moran and Scharff had knowledge 
of the prisoners’ culture, language, history, politics, attitudes, and customs, 
they could use that knowledge to orchestrate productive conversations. In 
this regard, Moran proved especially masterful since he had actually lived in 
Japan for several years. 
Both men took pains to make the prisoners feel comfortable and well-
treated, so they were more likely to engage in conversation. As a result, 
prisoners sometimes even felt they owed their interrogator, whether Scharff 
or Moran, an answer to his questions. A key factor of both Scharff’s and 
Moran’s techniques, given today’s military-interrogation climate, is that 
neither used either coercive methods or torture to make prisoners to talk. 
To the contrary, both regarded torture as counterproductive and an actual 
deterrent to obtaining useful information. 
Ultimately, because each man’s attitude was one of sincere respect and 
caring for his opponents, each created, in very different circumstances, a 
perfect atmosphere for successful interrogations. Prisoners perceived them as 
gentlemen thanks to the empathy they showed. Both were also true masters 
of conversation: friendly, open, and apparently frank. 
Although Moran had to ask more direct questions because of the “lack of 
time” factor, he still tried to not be too obviously systematic in his approach. 
Both men viewed the 
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He had a method for building up his questions to get the needed informa-
tion. It helped that many Japanese soldiers were actually happy to fall 
into American hands, which was heaven compared to what they endured 
defending Guadalcanal.40 They got clean clothes, food, a nice interrogator, 
and kindness, which caused some to question their own loyalties, and to turn 
around and support the United States. 
Like Moran, Scharff also tried to covertly elicit information. The American 
pilots he questioned had been taught in training that they would surely be 
tortured if captured. Instead they met Scharff, a polite, kind gentleman who 
treated them with respect. This was not the interrogation context they were 
familiar with from their training, and its very unexpectedness made them 
more likely to talk. To the prisoners, both Scharff’s and Moran’s presence was 
a relief from stress, and thanks to their warmth, the interrogators became 
identified as “friends.” Furthermore,” the very fact that Scharff and Moran 
created a less stressful environment helped prisoners remember more and be 
more willing to talk.41 
Both Scharff and Moran used techniques consistent with Robert Cialdini’s 
recent formulation of “six principles of persuasion:” 1) liking, 2) authority, 
3) reciprocity, 4) commitment / consistency, 5) social validation (proof ), and 
6) scarcity.42 Cialdini concludes that tactics based on these principles are 
particularly powerful because they are often subtle and hard to detect. They 
encourage people to respond in habitual, fairly automatic ways with little 
thinking, which makes such tactics often difficult to resist.
Conclusion
This review of the interrogation methods used by Hanns J. Scharff and Sher-
wood F. Moran offers a series of basic principles for successful interrogation 
under differing circumstances. Adapting their techniques for the training 
of today’s soldiers would increase the potential for successful interrogations 
and reduce the tendency to implement coercive and illegal methods. “Either 
of these two interrogators could have used torture if they believed torture 
was effective. However, both men knew their goal was not just to get their 
prisoners to talk—but to provide truthful information that met their intel-
ligence needs.”43 Both used non-coercive methods that drew out the truth, 
while treating the prisoners as fellow human beings. Learning from history 
what works—and what does not—can make a world of difference in terms 
of future interrogation practices. 
In sum, Hanns Joachim Scharff and Sherwood Ford Moran were especially 
gifted and successful interrogators because, first and foremost, they viewed 
their prisoners as human beings deserving of respect and decent treat-
ment. Both men had excellent conversational skills and cultural knowledge 
acquired through personal experience, and they used these skills to their 
advantage in the interrogation setting. When assigning people as interroga-
tors, these should be crucial factors still. 
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Al Shabaab, which is generally described as a “Salafi-jihadist 
movement,” is a major player and instigator in the ongoing fight to win 
control of Somalia.1 For about four years after its inception in 2006, al 
Shabaab focused its violence in Somalia only. In 2008, its leader,  Ahmed 
Abdi Aw-Mohamed “Godane,” pledged loyalty to al Qaeda and the goal 
of global jihad.2 The group turned into a transnational threat, however, 
when it carried out twin bombings in Kampala, Uganda, on July 11, 2010. 
The African Union and the struggling Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia, with the backing of the United States, were unable to make much 
progress against al Shabaab until Spring 2011. Since then, they have launched 
a series of offensive operations that succeeded in winning back some of the 
terrorists’ strongholds, including the vital Bakara market in Mogadishu, and 
the strategic town of Afogye. As of this writing, however, the terrorists are 
still strongly resisting, and the international coalition has been unable to 
attain a decisive victory. 
The international community has concentrated on understanding al 
Shabaab’s operational component while giving little attention to how it 
finances itself. This article endeavors to fill in at least some of that gap. The 
first section examines al Shabaab’s primary sources of funds, how the group 
moves those funds to where they are needed, and how it spends its money. 
The second part examines the successes and weaknesses of the countermea-
sures different actors are using to defund al Shabaab, and recommends ways 
to use the available information about its financing to impair the group. In 
particular, cutting al Shabaab off from the Somali port of Kismayo, which is 
now its principal source of funding, could be fatal to the group.
In May 2011, troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
and the Transitional Federal Government began a fierce battle to force al 
Shabaab out of the Bakara market in Mogadishu, where the group had been 
taxing merchants to finance its assaults on the government’s forces. On 
August 6, 2011, al Shabaab’s fighters were finally forced to withdraw from 
Bakara, and the group has suffered from the loss of revenue streams from the 
market. 
Although it has been forced from Mogadishu, al Shabaab still controls large 
areas of the country, including the southern and central parts of Somalia. 
The port city of Kismayo has been identified as the most important current 
source of revenue for the group. According to a BBC report, “Kismayo, a port 
city, is a key asset for the militants, allowing supplies to reach areas under 
their control and providing taxes for their operations.”3 It is fair to speculate 
that without the funds raised through Kismayo, al Shabaab’s military activi-
ties would be severely impeded.
LTC Geoffrey Kambere, UPDF
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How al Shabaab Raises Money
As with all organizations, financial channels are the hidden arteries that 
keep al Shabaab alive. Al Shabaab has leaned on different sources of revenue 
to finance terrorist acts for the past several years, including state sponsors, 
charities, individuals in the Somali diaspora, other terrorist groups, and 
businesses. Funds typically are transferred through hawala, an informal 
remittance system traditional to many Islamic communities; through regular 
banking channels; and by courier. The money goes mainly to support the 
group’s members, and for the training, recruiting, weapons, and equip-
ment required to sustain the Somali insurgency and wage jihad against 
non-believers.
State Sponsorship
A number of observers have asserted that Eritrea sponsors al Shabaab in an 
attempt to counter the regional power, Ethiopia, Eritrea’s long-time enemy. 
Eritrea has consistently denied the allegations. Eritrea reportedly supplies 
weapons, military training, and even troops to fight alongside al Shabaab’s 
militants.4 In addition, a United Nations report claims that Eritrea has sent 
$80,000 per month to some members of al Shabaab through the Eritrean 
Embassy in Nairobi for almost a decade.5
Yemen, Syria, Iran, and Qatar are also regularly accused by the Somali Tran-
sitional Government of providing funds and weapons to al Shabaab.6 For in-
stance, in January 2010, the Transitional Government’s Minister of Defense, 
Sheikh Yusuf Muammad Siad—alias Indho Adde—reported that Yemeni 
rebels had sent two boatloads of light weapons, ammunition, Kalashnikovs, 
and hand grenades to the al Shabaab-controlled port of Kismayo.7 Subse-
quently, a March 2010 U.N. monitoring group claimed that Muhammad 
Sa’iid Atom, an al Shabab-affiliated militant commander in Puntland, had 
been receiving arms shipments from Yemen and Eritrea.8 In addition, Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf states have remained significant external sources of 
funds for the al Shabaab organization. Saudi Arabia has long been known for 
financing “Salafi jihadists.”9 
Charities, Donations, Other Terrorist Organizations
Terrorist organizations similar to al Qaeda (international jihadists) and other 
militant Islamic organizations contribute funds to al Shabaab to spread 
extremism in the Horn of Africa and other parts of the world.10 The World 
Assembly for Muslim Youth and the International Islamic Relief Organiza-
tion (IIRO), as well as Somali businesses in the Gulf states, Europe, the 
United States, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore are active 
financiers of radical Islamic movements in the Horn of Africa.11
Some charitable organizations that formerly channeled funds to al Itihaad, 
the Islamist group that preceded al Shabaab, are likewise suspected of 
maintaining links with al Shabaab. 
These organizations include the African Muslims Agency in 
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Kuwait; the Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emir-
ates; the al Islah Charity, which is linked to Harakat al-Islah, 
a Somali diaspora group founded in Saudi Arabia; the Muslim 
World League (Rabitat al-Islam al-‘âlamiyya) and its subsidiary, 
the International Islamic Relief Organization, both based in 
Saudi Arabia; Dawa al-Islamiyya; and the al Wafa Charitable 
Society, which is listed as a “specially designated terrorist entity” 
by the U.S. government for its suspected support to terrorist 
organizations.12
A diaspora is defined as “a people with a common origin who reside, more 
or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious 
homeland—whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or 
under foreign control.”13 An estimated one million Somalis now live outside 
the country, in sizable Somali communities in the Middle East, Europe, 
and North America. Some of these diaspora Somalis financially support al 
Shabaab. In late 2010, for example, three Somali men and one woman were 
arrested in San Diego, and charged with knowingly providing financial 
assistance to al Shabaab.14 In another case, a St. Louis cabdriver named 
Mohamud Abdi Yusuf pleaded guilty in 2010 to conspiracy and providing 
material support to a designated terrorist organization after admitting he 
had raised nearly $6,000 for al Shabaab to continue its struggle against the 
Transitional Government.15 Other supporters include wealthy businessmen, 
such as Saudi Sheikh Mohamed Abu Faid, who is reportedly the group’s 
lead financier, and Omar Hammami, who is in charge of financing mili-
tants from the United States—often U.S.-born teenagers from immigrant 
families—who join al Shabaab.16 
The Somalis in the diaspora are estimated to remit $500 million to $800 
million annually back to friends and family in their homeland, according to 
at least one researcher.17 Some of this money, even when it comes into the 
country legally, will end up in the hands of extremists.
In addition, al Shabaab apparently has benefited from Somalis residing in 
Nairobi and in the Dadaab refugee camp in northern Kenya. Al Shabaab is 
said to have links with the Pumwani Riyadya Mosque Committee (PRMC) 
religious organization in Nairobi, which has a network of sympathizers who 
raise money for the group.18 A good deal of money for al Shabaab also is 
collected from the PRMC apparently under the pretense of reconstructing a 
mosque. Ahmed Imam Ali, a Kenyan and the PRMC’s secretary, is reported 
to be siphoning off funds raised for social projects in Nairobi to facilitate the 
training and recruitment of insurgents in Kenya.19  
In addition to receiving money from religious donations abroad, members 
of al Shabaab take advantage of the extensive black markets in places like 
Eastleigh, a Somali immigrant neighborhood in Nairobi, raising reasonably 
large sums of money to support the group’s activities. 
Some reports indicate that Somalis raise money for al Shabaab in the form 
of zakat, an Islamic religious tithe.20 Moreover, according to some sources, 
big companies such as Dahabshiil Bank, which is based in Mogadishu, 
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send payments to al Shabaab in exchange for safe access to areas under al 
Shabaab’s control.21 It is said that businesspeople are forced to pay “taxes” 
equivalent to the cost of an AK-47 in order to keep from losing their entire 
business inventory. In addition, al Shabaab exacts high tariffs from the 
informal Islamic banking system of hawala to boost its income, with little 
apparent regard for the effect this financial drain has on Somalia’s economic 
activity.
Businesses in Kismayo
In 2008, al Shabaab took over Kismayo, the third-largest city in Somalia, 
after fighting a fierce three-day battle, later called the “Battle of Kismayo,” 
against pro-government militias. The group quickly imposed harsh admin-
istrative rules based in shari’a law on the port’s business community. To 
raise revenue, al Shabaab increased the fees for importing and exporting 
goods through the port, one of the largest in the country, by 30 percent.22 
The most important economic activities in Kismayo are fishing, the import 
of goods like rice from Pakistan, and the export of primary goods such as 
livestock (camels, sheep, and goats), charcoal, and khat to the Gulf states.23 
One analyst for African affairs estimates that the taxes al Shabaab collects 
from the business community in Kismayo include “over $1 million quarterly 
in port-use charges alone.”24
Al Shabaab earns considerable money from the charcoal industry, one of 
Somalia’s main exports, and the chief commodity to pass through Kismayo’s 
port facilities. According to one report, in the southern sector near the 
border between Kenya and Somalia, “The cutting down of trees in large areas 
is evidence of the booming trade in charcoal that was a source of income 
for the militia group.”25 Vast deforestation in the areas under al Shabaab’s 
control is another sign  of the lucrative charcoal trade between al Shabaab 
and the Gulf states. It is estimated that al Shabaab exports charcoal worth 
$500,000 per month to the Gulf states.26 
Besides the considerable income al Shabaab receives through heavy taxes on 
imports and exports, militants also systematically collect taxes from farmers 
on Kismayo’s outskirts. In March 2010, the government’s Minister of Agri-
culture, Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade, claimed that al Shabaab was ex-
torting $150 per hectare from farmers in the fertile Lower Shabelle Valley, and 
blamed the group’s predations for a decrease in agricultural production.27
Since 2008, the port of Kismayo has become the main source of revenue for 
the terrorist group. According to one report, the United Nations believes that 
“al Shabaab collects an estimated U.S. $35–50 million annually in custom 
tolls and taxes on businesses in Kismayo and two secondary ports higher 
up the coast.”28 This is one reason that Kismayo is referred to as the nerve 
center for the militants. Instead of using the large sums of money collected 
in Kismayo to maintain the port and city and meet the needs of the local 
population, al Shabaab sends most of the funds to other areas under its 
control to advance its insurgency.29
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In October 2011, the Kenya Defence Forces struck a blow at one source 
of funding for al Shabaab when it took control of Ras Kamboni and Bur 
Gaboby, two coastal fishing towns that formerly had been controlled by the 
militants.30 Ras Kamboni, which is closer to Kenya and serves as a base for 
fishermen supplying seafood to hotels in Lamu and island local resorts, had 
been a particularly large source of income for al Shabaab.31
Piracy and Extortion
Al Shabaab has long been thought to be connected with Somali pirate 
groups operating in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, but it had been 
difficult to establish a direct connection between the Islamists and pirates. 
In December 2010, however, al Shabaab took control of a pirate base called 
Harardheere from Hizbul Islam, another Islamist group in Somalia, and 
reportedly reached a compromise with the local pirate gangs that would give 
the militants a 20 percent share of all ransoms received from the hijacking 
of ships.32 While there is no documentation to confirm such a deal, its share 
of the ransom money certainly has been lucrative for al Shabaab. Revenues 
from piracy also have boosted development in parts of Somalia, making it 
politically even more difficult to put a stop to pirate activity.33 
Looting the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are operating in 
areas controlled by al Shabaab is another way the group survives. It has been 
widely reported that al Shabaab loots aid meant for the hunger-stricken 
populace: in March 2010, the U.N. Monitoring Group alleged that as 
much as “50 percent of food aid delivered to Somalia was being diverted to 
criminals and insurgents, including Al-Shabab.”34 Even worse, the practice 
of kidnapping and ransoming aid workers has also boosted al Shabaab’s 
finances, while some NGOs and U.N. agencies pay “registration fees” of $500 
or more in order to be allowed to operate in areas controlled by al Shabaab.35
With such a variety of funding sources, even if external support from state 
sponsors and the diaspora is successfully cut off, al Shabaab’s money flow can 
be efficiently replaced with internal money sources, including taxes, business 
profits, port fees, extortion, and security protection fees from prominent 
business people and aid workers. In addition, the group’s cooperation with 
Somali pirates remains a source of income.
How al Shabaab Moves and Spends its Money
Al Shabaab moves funds through the standard system of banks and couriers, 
but also through the traditional Muslim system of hawala, an informal 
means of transferring value and remittances through networks of brokers.36 
Hawala, common throughout Somalia, is based on trust and honor, and can 
be effective, reliable, and efficient; the fact that few, if any, records are kept, 
is an added bonus for groups like al Shabaab.37 It is possible to organize 
transfers through secret senders and receivers who do not record and will 
not disclose details of the transactions. On the negative side, hawala typi-
cally involves a great deal of communication by phone, e-mail, and fax, 
so once a broker comes under suspicion for working with terrorists, his or 
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her transactions may be traceable. In Somalia, hawala is the most common 
way of transferring money, and is regularly used by ordinary Somalis, but 
authorities believe it is also used by many al Shabaab sympathizers to support 
the group’s objectives.38
Somalis in the diaspora also use wire services such as Western Union and 
MoneyGram to send money to their relatives in Somalia. These services are 
well-established in neighboring Kenya, where al Shabaab has a strong pres-
ence. Analysts assume that some portion of the money transferred by Somalis 
through regular wire and bank services is diverted to al Shabaab, although no 
figures are available. 
Al Shabaab spends most of its money on four things: providing social ser-
vices to its members (including paying salaries to foreign fighters); fighting 
to overthrow Somalia’s Transitional Government and to expel Ethiopian 
troops from Somali territory; waging a violent campaign against nonbelievers 
(jihad), which includes recruiting and training fighters and buying weapons 
and equipment; and preaching extremism. Al Shabaab operatives often 
carry cash on their missions. For example, the perpetrators of the Kampala, 
Uganda bombings on July 11, 2010, carried their own money, as did the 
terror cell members who supported those bombings by crossing into Uganda 
with extra funds. The cash method leaves no trail, making it difficult to track 
the terrorists or their funding. 
Recommendations and Conclusion
Too little attention has been paid to creating strategies to counter the 
financial streams that feed al Shabaab. The current AMISOM (African Union 
Mission in Somalia) operations against the group are aimed at attacking and 
eliminating militants; these operations have managed to chase the extremists 
out of Mogadishu, but not from other parts of Somalia. In addition, opera-
tions launched recently in southern Somalia by the Kenyan Defence Forces 
have neither stopped al Shabaab militants from carrying out their operations 
nor disrupted the financial channels that keep them active. 
Since the attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, the inter-
national community has put in place countermeasures against terrorism 
funding and money laundering. For instance, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) was formed in 1989 with 36 member states, including the 
European Union, the United States, and Canada.39 The FATF, however, is a 
policy-making body that has concentrated on limiting transfers and strength-
ening the documentation required of governments. Consequently, the ability 
to use hawala to send money to al Shabaab from outside Somalia depends 
only on the enforcement practices of the country from which the funds are 
sent.40 Respect for sovereignty has made international efforts to limit such 
transactions ineffective, and the international system to combat money 
laundering is not binding.
Disrupting al Shabaab’s funding channels can be especially difficult to 
accomplish in Somali communities, because some of the group’s funding 
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is through normal, day-to-day financial activities. The enormous sums of 
money collected by the terrorist group at Port Kismayo, however, can be 
minimized or eliminated, particularly if the current offensive succeeds and 
control of the port can be turned over to the Transitional Government or 
AMISOM. 
Most authorities in Kismayo portray al Shabaab as an insurgent rather than 
terrorist organization, running a well-organized administrative system. The 
booming business environment of the port will keep al Shabaab strong 
as long as the group controls Kismayo. It is therefore imperative that 
international efforts to destroy al Shabaab should concentrate not only on 
countering its fighting tactics, but also on implementing long-term strate-
gies to derail its administrative structure and operations around the port of 
Kismayo. 
Those who are trying to dry up al Shabaab’s money streams should pay 
particular attention to the means the terrorists use to avoid local and 
international financial control measures, especially when the transactions 
come through “innocent” front groups. East African Community members 
should work through the Community’s counterterrorism agency to step up 
money-laundering and business-control measures across all domains, and to 
dedicate resources to counterterrorism not only at the central government 
and state levels, but also at the grass-roots level. 
The Kenyan government, in particular, needs to better monitor places where 
large numbers of Somalis and Islamists live, especially Eastleigh, a neighbor-
hood in Nairobi that is also known as “little Mogadishu.” It is a thriving 
business and shopping district, and also a hub for the kinds of financial 
transactions—transfers and remittances by hawala and wire services—that 
benefit both Somali pirates who need to launder money and al Shabaab. 
Police occasionally crack down on undocumented immigrants residing in 
the area, but these moves are sporadic, and often indiscriminate. The central 
government apparently exercises minimal control over Eastleigh’s rapid 
growth, which is fed by a steady influx of Somali refugees from over the 
border, although that may be changing as the area prospers.41
Kenya and its neighbors must put greater effort into properly registering 
parallel banking systems, such as mobile money services, since these services 
have proved to be an easy way to transfer money out of the country, and 
they surpass traditional banks in terms of their geographical reach. Govern-
ments also need to implement universal SIM card registration, so that every 
SIM card would be registered to an individual; such a system would help 
authorities to track money moved through mobile services. 
To defeat al Shabaab, international efforts must focus on how to recapture 
Kismayo Port. If al Shabaab continues to utilize this port as its hub, all 
efforts to destroy the group may be prolonged, as the terrorists can easily re-
equip themselves, make money through imports and exports, and coordinate 
with Somali pirates through Kismayo. 
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In East Africa, community-based and ideologically rooted support has 
helped provide the finances al Shabaab needs to survive and sustain its opera-
tions. For years al Shabaab was focused narrowly on expelling Ethiopian 
troops and winning control of Somalia’s government. Today it has regional 
objectives in line with al Qaeda’s “global jihad,” and its sources of funding 
have significantly broadened so that it no longer solely depends on external 
support from places like Eritrea. Regardless of what strategy AMISOM adopts 
to defeat the terrorists, Kenya must be involved because Kenya is not only a 
home for Islamist extremists, but also a financial conduit for al Shabaab. The 
fact that al Shabaab has continued to receive support from various overseas 
sources means that the measures put in place to close down funding channels 
for terrorist groups have not been effective in this case. 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
LTC Geoffrey Kambere serves as the deputy chief of the Integrated Human 
Resource Management Information System, Ugandan People’s Defence 
Forces. He recently graduated from the Defense Analysis department of the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
Measures to close down 
funding channels for terrorist 
groups have not been effective 
in this case.
NOTES
1 Salafi-jihadists are followers of the modern Sunni Islamic 
Movement, or Salafism, which adheres to a rigid and strict 
interpretation of Islam associated with violence against 
non-believers. Al Shabaab promotes an authoritarian form of 
“Salafi” Islam that stresses an inflexible interpretation of the 
Qur’an, with the aim of overthrowing the current government 
and implementing shari’a law. See Christopher Harnisch, 
“The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization 
of Al-Shabaab,” Critical Threats Project, February 12, 2010, 
14-17: http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/terror-threat-
somalia-internationalization-al-shabaab-feb-12-2010
2 David Shinn, “Al-Shabaab Tries to Take Control of Somalia,” 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 5, 2012: 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201011.shinn.somalia.html
3 “Q&A: Who Are Somalia’s al-Shabab?” BBC News, 
last updated February 23, 2012: http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689
4 Gabe Joselow, “All Eyes on Eritrea as Arms Shipment Reaches 
Al-Shabab,” Voice of America, November 1, 2011: http://www.
voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/All-Eyes-on-Eritrea-
as-Arms-Shipment-Reaches-Al-Shabab-133079288.html
5 Joselow, “All Eyes on Eritrea;” and, Pieter D. Wezeman, 
“Arms Flows and the Conflict in Somalia,” SIPRI 
Background Paper, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), October 2010: http://
books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP1010b.pdf
6 Joselow, “All Eyes on Eritrea.”
7 Gulf of Aden Security Review, Critical Threats, 
American Enterprise Institute, January 4, 2010: http://
www.criticalthreats.org/gulf-aden-security-review/
gulf-aden-security-review-january-4-2010
8 Claude Heller, “Letter dated 26 February 2010 from 
the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, 
addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 751 
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, 
addressed to the President of the Security Council,” UN 
Security Council, New York, March 10, 2010, 45: http://
somalitalkradio.com/2010/mar/un_report_somalia.pdf
9 James M. Dorsey, “Saudi Arabia Embraces Salafism: 
Countering the Arab Uprising?” Fair Observer, February 
27, 2012: http://www.fairobserver.com/article/
saudi-arabia-embraces-salafism-countering-arab-uprising
10 Abdulkadir Abdiraham, “Islam AU Summit: A/S Carson’s 
meeting with Somali President Sheikh Sharif Tripoli,” The 




11 Abdisaid M. Ali, “The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin: A Profile 
of the First Somali Terrorist Organisation,” Institut für 
Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung 
(ISPSW), June 2, 2008: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/
Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=55851
12 Andre Lesage, “The Rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia: 
An Assessment of Impact and Agendas,” paper presented 
to the 45th Annual International Studies Association 
Convention, Montreal, Canada, March 17–20, 2004, 9.
13 Valter Vilko, “Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal 
Extraction,” Minor Field Study, Dept. of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University, March 2011, 5-6: http://
www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/57/57537_MFS_paper_Vilkko.
pdf. The author describes how a shrinking flow of funds 
from emigrant communities is forcing the group to rely 
more and more on internal Somali sources of funding. 
Vol. 2, No. 3 | CTX 
47
14 Tony Perry, “Woman Arrested in San Diego on Charge 
of Providing Money to Somali Terrorists,” Los Angeles 
Times, November 15, 2010: http://latimesblogs.latimes.
com/lanow/2010/11/woman-arrested-in-san-diego-on-
charge-of-providing-money-to-somali-terrorists.html
15 Robert Patrick, “St. Louis Cabbie Gets 11+ Years for Sending 
Money to Terrorist Group,” STLtoday.com, last updated 
June 19, 2012: http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/
st-louis-cabbie-gets-years-for-sending-money-to-terrorist/
article_2a272094-ba3e-11e1-b919-0019bb30f31a.html/
16 Shinn, “Al Shabaab Tries to Take Control.”
17 Kenneth Menkhaus, “African Diasporas, Diasporas in Africa 
and Terrorist Threats,” in The Radicalization of Diasporas and 
Terrorism, Doron Zimmerman and William Rosenau, eds. 
(Zurich: ETH Center for Security Studies, 2009), 87–88.
18 Geoffrey Mosoku, “Kenya: Riyadha Officials Deny 
Links to Al-Shabab,” AllAfrica, August 1, 2011: http://
allafrica.com/stories/201108021489.html
19 “Immigrant Admits Funneling Money to Terrorist Group in 
Somalia,” STLtoday.com, November 4, 2011: http://www.
vikispot.com/page/5168237/immigrant-admits-funneling-mon
20 Ali, “The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin.” 
21 “Why Blockading Kismayo Will Not Weaken 
Shabab Financially,” Inside the Insurgency, October 31, 2011: 
http://insidetheinsurgency.wordpress.com/2011/10/31/
why-blockading-kismayo-will-not-weaken-shabab-financially/
22 MHD, “Life in Kismayo under Shabaab Rule: Shabaab 
Mobilizing for Defense of Kismayo,” Somalia Report, February 
12, 2012: http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2770
23 Khat, a plant native to the Horn of Africa and the 
Arabian Peninsula, is very popular throughout the Gulf 
states and North Africa as a traditional stimulant, and 
is often enjoyed in social groups the way Westerners 
drink coffee. Al Shabaab heavily taxes its sale.
24 Lauren Ploch, “Countering Terrorism in East Africa: 
The U.S. Response,” Congressional Research Service 
Report, November 3, 2010, 21: https://www.
hsdl.org/?view&doc=133814&coll=limited
25 John Ngirachu, “Al Shabaab Militia’s Tight Grip on 
‘Desert’ Charcoal Trade.” allAfrica, November 13, 2011: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201111140919.html 
26 H.S. Puri,“Letter dated 18 July 2011 from the Chairman of 
the Security Council Committee pursuant to Resolutions 
751 (1992) and1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and 
Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
UN Security Council, July 18, 2011: http://www.scribd.
com/doc/61447283/July-UN-Report-of-the-Monitoring-
Group-on-Somalia-and-Eritrea-PDF-Muigwithania-Com
27 Mohamed Abdi, “Somalia’s minister for agriculture accuses 
Alshabab for the farmers’ low harvest,” Network Al Shahid, 
March 24, 2010: http://english.alshahid.net/archives/5426
28 Tim Lister, “Fertile Territory for Al Shabaab in 
Chaos of Somalia,” CNN, last updated February 23, 
2012: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/01/world/
africa/al-shabaab-guide/index.html?hpt=hp_c2
29 Abdulkadir Abdiraham, “Teenage Al-Shabaab Soldiers in 
Training,” Demotix News, October 29, 2010: http://www.
demotix.com/news/495081/teenage-al-shabaab-soldiers-training
30 Ngirachu, “Al Shabaab Militia’s Tight Grip.”
31 Ibid.
32 “The Saga of MV Iceberg: One Ship, Three Different 
Stories,” Somalia Report, July 26, 2012: http://
www.somaliareport.com/index.php/topic/63/
33 Sarah Childress, “Somali Militants Try Piracy to Fund 




35 Vilko, “Al-Shabaab: From External Support 
to Internal Extraction,” 21. 
36 Animesh Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network Targets 
India from the Gulf States,” Terrorism Monitor, vol. 7, no. 19 
(July 2, 2009): 8, retrieved from The Jamestown Foundation 
website: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_
ttnews[tt_news]=35221&tx_ttnews[backPid]=412&no_cache=1
37 Laura Yuen, “‘Hawalas’ Provide Lifeline to Impoverished 
Somalis,” MPR News, April 29, 2009: http://minnesota.
publicradio.org/display/web/2009/04/09/moneytransfer_folo/
38 “Special report: In Africa, a militant group’s 
growing appeal,” Reuters, May 30, 2012: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/30/
us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530
39 Vilko, “Al-Shabaab: From External Support 
to Internal Extraction,” 10.
40 Ibid.
41 Bedah Mengo, “Eastleigh Estate Nairobi has become Somali 
business hub,” Hiiraan Online, March 13, 2011: http://www.
hiiraan.com/news2/2011/mar/eastleigh_estate_nairobi_
has_become_somali_business_hub.aspx; and Parselelo 
Kantai, “Inside Garissa Lodge, Nairobi’s Somali Trading 
Hub,” The Africa Report, January 31, 2011: http://www.
theafricareport.com/index.php/east-horn-africa/inside-
garissa-lodge-nairobi-s-somali-trading-hub-5136196.html
CTX | Vol. 2, No. 3
48
That was a way of putting it—not very satisfactory... 
Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle  
With words and meanings.
 —T.S. Eliot1 
Since the United States began its fight against global jihadists 
more than ten years ago, the U.S. government has struggled to find the 
right term to describe those fighters who take up jihadist activities after their 
release from the detention camp at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba. In recent years, released prisoners who return to battle have been 
described as “recidivist,” “returning to the battlefield,” “reengaging,” “return-
ing to the fight,” and “returning to militant activities.”2 The terms, while 
similar, are not equivalent, nor are they appropriate for the former prisoners. 
As Mark Twain once noted, “The difference between the right word and the 
almost right word is the difference between lightning and a lightning bug.” 
Part of the difficulty rests with the conditions under which prisoners were 
first detained and brought to Guantánamo Bay, and the terms under which 
they were subsequently released. This article begins with a discussion of how 
the terms we use for those former Guantanamo prisoners affect not only how 
we perceive them, but also their legal status once they leave U.S. custody. It 
then looks at the concept of parole for prisoners of war in both the Islamic 
tradition and in the Geneva Conventions, and concludes by arguing for the 
establishment of a systematic parole procedure that confers the correct legal 
status on these released prisoners under the International Laws of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC).3 
Status Under the Law
In most systems of law, rights, responsibilities, and due process depend to a 
large degree on definitions of status. The terms we choose to define the status 
of former prisoners of war (POWs) therefore have a direct bearing on their 
standing before the law, and on how we may legally deal with them if they 
are recaptured. The legal gap between a paroled fighter who is recaptured 
after returning to the battlefield and the re-arrest of a common criminal 
who offends again is vast, so to call both of them “recidivists,” as some U.S. 
officials have done, is to ignore the implications of the recaptured fighter’s 
status under the LOAC. It is difficult to find any crime in the criminal justice 
system that is analogous to a fighter being taken prisoner in the course of 
armed conflict. 
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The George W. Bush administration (2001–2009) was adamant that pris-
oners from Afghanistan and al Qaeda do not meet the criteria to be classified 
as legal combatants according to the laws of war. Bush was, nevertheless, 
very careful to make sure that while such prisoners did not merit the rights of 
POWs, they would, for humanitarian reasons, be offered the same treatment 
as POWs under the 1949 Geneva Convention (know as the Third Geneva 
Convention).4 The correctness of this determination is beyond the scope 
of this article; its adoption, however, has a direct bearing on the detainees’ 
status both as prisoners and subsequently, after they are released.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 779 individuals have 
been held at Guantánamo since January 2002. The most recent U.S. govern-
ment report (January 2012) says that 600 have left the facility, eight died 
while in custody, and 171 remain. Of the 600 released prisoners, 27 percent 
(161 individuals) were confirmed or suspected by the U.S. government to 
have engaged in terrorist or insurgent activities post-release.5 To term these 
161 individuals “recidivists,” as U.S. officials and the press frequently do, is a 
misnomer that demilitarizes the context of their action and diminishes the 
gravity of their LOAC violation. It appears to classify the action of retaking 
arms in violation of an oath not to do so as a civil crime, vice a crime against 
international law and the acknowledged customs of war, and potentially 
diminishes the scope of legal retaliation if they are recaptured. 
Wartime Parole
The practice of wartime parole has been documented by international 
scholars to date back at least as far as the Punic Wars between Rome and 
Carthage (264–146 B.C.).6 Parole is “an engagement by a prisoner of war, 
upon being set at liberty, that he will not again take up arms against the 
government by whose forces he was captured, either for a limited period 
or while hostilities continue.”7 The U.S. DoD defines parole more broadly: 
“Parole agreements are promises given the captor by a POW to fulfill stated 
conditions, such as not to bear arms or not to escape, in consideration of 
special privileges, such as release from captivity or lessened restraint.”8 
Since its inception, parole violation has always been a problem for the 
detaining power, which often resorted to execution of the recaptured trans-
gressor.9 The system is only as effective as the individual’s honor, or his state’s 
enforcement of the cartel; therefore, violators have been treated with severity. 
Until the Hague Rules of Land Warfare were codified in 1899, no written 
international convention covered warfare for the European continent. Both 
these rules and the unratified Brussels Declaration on Laws and Customs of 
War (1874) treated parole violation with draconian harshness, stating that 
violators forfeited all rights as POWs. Article 12 of the Hague Regulations at-
tached a sort of capitis deminutio to any breach of parole: anyone who broke 
his parole forfeited the right to be treated as a POW, and therefore, if recap-
tured, had the status of an outlaw.10 Under Article 134 of the U.S. Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, POWs may be tried for a violation of parole, subject 
to a maximum punishment of confinement at hard labor for six months.11
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Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention lays out specific rights and 
responsibilities for both the “Detaining Power,” the country that imprisoned 
the enemy combatant, and the prisoner. Specifically: 
The Detaining Power may not ... offer release on parole to pris-
oners of war if the laws and regulations of the Power on which 
they depend [i.e., the country they serve at the time of capture] 
forbid them to accept ... [or] only to the extent [that such laws 
and regulations allow] and subject to the conditions specified 
therein.12
Article 21 stringently forbids the captor from offering these or soldiers like 
them a choice they cannot legally accept. For instance, the U.S. and U.K. 
militaries prohibit their own soldiers who become POWs from accepting 
parole from the enemy if captured. The official commentary on Article 21 
notes, “The Detaining Power is in a way responsible for the application of 
these laws and regulations, and is not allowed to make any proposals ... 
which would be inconsistent with [them].”13
Furthermore, Article 21 forbids the “Detaining Power” from coercing or 
compelling a prisoner to accept liberty in return for promises. A prisoner 
who is offered the choice between internment or parole “is faced with a 
problem of conscience which he must be absolutely free to solve. A person 
who gives his parole gives a personal undertaking on his honor for which he is 
in the first place responsible to himself.”14 [Emphasis added.] Prisoners who do 
legally accept parole, however, “are bound on their personal honor scrupu-
lously to fulfill ... [the terms] of their paroles and promises.” Nor can the 
“Power on which they depend” legally require or accept service from parolees 
that violates the terms of their parole.15 
A decline in the practice of offering parole to POWs during the 20th century 
led directly to the current practice of holding captives until the “cessation 
of hostilities.” World War I saw very limited use of parole, both because 
the warring Powers had the logistical and physical capacity to hold large 
numbers of POWs, and because serial violations of parole early in the conflict 
had undermined its value.16 While the Geneva Convention of 1929 mentions 
parole only twice, and only with regard to notification of prisoner status, 
the belligerents of World War II made some use of it. At the end of World 
War II, millions of German captives deemed to pose no further threat were 
paroled to alleviate overcrowding in Allied prisons, and to reduce the cost of 
incarcerating and feeding them. As a result, the post-war Powers modified 
the Geneva Conventions to include parole. The Korean War, the Vietnam 
conflict, and the first Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), however, all saw only 
limited utilization of this practice.17
The Current Situation
Asymmetric warfare and non-state combatants have been a persistent aspect 
of conflict throughout history, and there have been far more of these “small 
wars,” even in the modern era, than conventional state-on-state conflicts. 
The current war against 
jihadism presents a unique 
legal conundrum for the 
United States.
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Nevertheless, the current war against jihadism presents a unique legal conun-
drum for the United States. Unlike previous conventional fights, where it 
could be assumed that the defeat of one side would bring an end to hostili-
ties, the conflicts the United States now finds itself in—the so-called “long 
wars”—have no such obvious end, and the enemies who have been captured 
are not fighting on behalf of a nation-state. To use the phrase of the Geneva 
Convention, they have no “Power on which they depend.” If members of al 
Qaeda or other terrorist networks are not considered legal combatants, what 
are the terms on which they should be released from custody?
On January 11, 2002, the Bush administration shipped its first prisoners from 
Afghanistan to Camp X-Ray at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In the first three 
months of 2002, the year operations began in Afghanistan, American forces 
airlifted over 600 prisoners to Guantánamo for long-term detention. 
Taliban fighters, who had at one time rep-
resented a now-defunct state government, 
necessitated a further definition of enemy 
captives. It was decided that Taliban pris-
oners would face prolonged captivity at 
Guantánamo in a status akin to those al 
Qaeda members they had harbored, that 
is, without legal combatant POW status, 
but rather as unlawful combatants 
of a rogue regime that had harbored 
terrorists.18 Ten years later, the United 
States is still holding many of these 
“unlawful combatants,” while lawyers 
and politicians argue over their future 
in a fight without a foreseeable end. 
Since most of them are not spon-
sored by a nation-state to which 
they owe their allegiance,19 how-
ever, any pledge per Article 21,  
not to reengage in hostilities 
against the United States and its 
allies after release, relies almost 
entirely on their personal sense 
of honor. 20 When contemplating 
the applicability of parole for 
Guantánamo detainees, Ken-
neth Anderson, a professor of 
law at the American Univer-
sity’s Washington College, 
acknowledged the importance 
of both parties’ having a “shared view as to the legiti-
macy of parole as a practice with its own norms of conduct, and above all 
an obligation not to return to the fight.”21
But is this a realistic expectation? As one ethicist put it, do terrorists share a 
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some to imagine how the term “personal honor” could apply to anyone who 
has been captured fighting with the Taliban or al Qaeda, or any other organi-
zation that routinely violates accepted laws of warfare. That being said, when 
discussing Muslim parole-breakers in the current war, it would be worthwhile 
to consider Islamic legal views on the subject.
Muslims first codified the rules of warfare based on the Qur’an,23 and Islamic 
shari’a law, which is based on interpretations of the Qur’an, regulates the 
international relations of many Muslim states.24 In this conception, the law 
of war applies as “soon as weapons have been used and armed forces have 
been deployed, even in the absence of a declaration of war.”25 Similarly, 
Islamic law does not distinguish between inter-state and non-state armed 
conflicts, primarily because when shari’a law came into being, between the 
seventh and tenth centuries A.D., the notion of nation states was undefined.26 
Accordingly, “the Islamic concept of humanitarian law [shari’a], ‘based on 
an unlimited belief in Divine Authority,’ is applicable everywhere and in all 
circumstances.”27 
According to many Muslim scholars, “a POW is considered a guest, rather 
than a captive whose fate is enslavement. Similar to the principles of the 
Geneva Conventions, captives or POWs are deemed to be in the hands of 
the Muslim Power, but not of the individuals or military units that captured 
them.”28 The Qur’an, the Hadith,29 the Sunna (Prophetic traditions), and 
the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) provide extensive instruc-
tions regarding the subject of POWs and when/if they should be taken.30 If a 
Muslim prisoner gives a pledge not to escape, for instance, he must faithfully 
observe his promise.31 If a prisoner is released conditionally, i.e., paroled, the 
releasee must abide by the conditions set by his captors and agreed upon by 
his acceptance of release. If a paroled prisoner of war is recaptured he faces 
punishment, usually capital. According to Islamic rules, a POW who has 
escaped his captors and is re-captured should not be punished, except insofar 
as it might constitute a “breach of parole.”32 In at least two instances, the 
Prophet Muhammad himself is known to have executed parole violators.33 
American soldiers who first arrived in Afghanistan in late 2001 noted that, 
“The Afghans, in keeping with their custom, expect soldiers who have 
surrendered to abide by the conditions of their surrender agreement and to 
behave honorably.”34 Muslim nations have almost universally adopted the 
Third Geneva Convention, including the 1977 protocols, and Islamic law and 
regulations on the parole of POWs appear to be compatible with Article 21 
of the Convention.35 Islamic scholar Muhammad Abdel Haleem infers from 
his study of Islamic holy texts and jurisprudence that, “in the sphere of war 
and peace, there is nothing in the Qur’an or Hadith which should cause 
Muslims to feel unable to sign and act according to the modern international 
conventions.”36 
The Way Forward
Almost a decade after the first detainees were sent to the prison at Guantá-
namo Bay, and three years after President Barack Obama promised to close 
“The Afghans expect soldiers 
who have surrendered to 
behave honorably.”
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the prison, 171 of Guantánamo’s prisoners remain in custody.37 As mentioned 
previously, just over a quarter of the 600 former detainees who have left the 
detention facility are confirmed or suspected to have re-engaged in “terrorist 
or insurgent activities” against U.S. or allied forces and civilians.38 The span 
of time between when a detainee leaves Guantánamo and the U.S. intel-
ligence community first learns that he has reengaged in terrorist or insurgent 
activities is, on average, 2.5 years.39 There are several reasons to suppose that 
re-engagement rates will increase in the future.
1. Of the 600 detainees known to have been transferred out of Guantá-
namo since 2002, at least 179 were listed in the high-risk category.40 
Those who remain in custody generally are more senior members of 
jihadist organizations, who have been in custody longest and have 
the most evidence against them. They have the highest likelihood of 
taking senior positions should they be released.
2. Previously released prisoners have had time to reconnect with their 
organizations, reintegrate into terrorist networks, and get back in the 
fight. Those in rehabilitation programs in places like Saudi Arabia 
will continue to be released. Also, with more time, more reports of 
recaptured prisoners will come in, which is one reason the number of 
reactivated fighters will rise even as the number of released prisoners 
decreases.
3. U.S. officials acknowledge that detainees who leave Guantánamo 
are like “rock stars” in the jihadist community.41 It is likely that these 
former prisoners are viewed as a force multiplier by terrorist organiza-
tions, and quickly pulled back into the organization. 
4. Some governments are proving unwilling or unable to mitigate the 
risks posed by prisoners released into their custody. In some instances, 
jihadis have been set free despite assurances from their governments 
that they would remain incarcerated.
This raises one of the central questions of this discussion. Given that un-
lawful combatants (al Qaeda, Taliban, etc.) do not qualify for combatant im-
munity or legal status, are they still entitled to consideration for parole under 
the  LOAC? POWs are never “entitled” to parole; it is an act based on perceived 
benefit for the detaining power (for instance, to alleviate overcrowding or 
exchange prisoners), or for reasons related to the health of the detained as per 
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. This 
does not mean, however, that they can never be granted privileges or rights 
that pertain to lawful combatants. It is useful to think of the Geneva Con-
ventions as a “floor” of rights for POWs, beneath which the detaining power 
cannot go; that same power, however, can always bestow additional rights at 
its discretion. 
In 2004 the Bush administration created the Administrative Review Board 
(ARB) process for Guantánamo detainees, where each individual’s case is 
reviewed annually. There is no precedent for such boards, nor are they 
required by international law, the Geneva Conventions, or Army regulations 
governing retained personnel.42 “ARBs were created to have a formalized, 
documented and institutionalized process” for detainee transfers and release 
evaluations, as a means to correct deficiencies in the previous review system.43
Detainees who leave 
Guantánamo are like 
“rock stars” in the jihadist 
community.
Some who refused to sign 
[a parole] were nevertheless 
released.
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The ARB recommends for each detainee either continued detention for 
another year, release (parole), or transfer.44 Those recommended for parole 
are asked to sign an agreement not to associate with al Qaeda or the Taliban, 
or “engage in, assist, or conspire” with terrorists or terrorism or combat U.S. 
or allied forces.45 A DoD memo from July 2004 regarding the release of 25 
Guantánamo detainees states, “all enemy combatants must sign a conditional 
release agreement in which they agree not to reengage in armed conflict with 
the United States.”46 This practice does not seem always to be enforced by 
the releasing U.S. authorities, however, and some who refused to sign were 
nevertheless released.47
What is more, the language in the parole agreement used by the DoD does 
not require the detainee to forfeit anything if he is recaptured. He is no 
worse off for having violated his promise, and will simply end up back in 
Guantánamo (or another facility) as before. This is hardly a disincentive for 
re-engaging in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces.48 
If the United States plans to continue its current practice of “paroling” de-
tainees on terms of an oath, it should follow the letter and spirit of Article 21 
of the Third Geneva Convention. The parole documents should have teeth. 
“The specifications of the parole can be whatever is necessary to accomplish 
the purpose of excluding the paroled detainee from having any involvement 
in the conflict,” suggests a recent law review article.49 Given the fact that 
these detainees are not entitled to lawful combatant status in the first place, 
making clear that any subsequent detention would be less accommodating 
than the one they are in the process of leaving seems rational and reasonable. 
Equally important, it also reinforces the intrinsic value of the parole regime 
per se for the future. “A society would fail in this duty if it simply chose not 
to hold POWs accountable for future acts and then detained them as unac-
countable agents, when it could hold them accountable and release them,” 
writes Alec D. Walen on the rationality of paroling Guantánamo detainees.50 
Holding parolees to their oaths both gives those who wish to leave the fight a 
plausible reason to do so, and provides the state to which the oath was sworn 
grounds for re-arrest without waiting for a violent act to occur, if there is 
evidence the parolee has returned to the fight.51 
Since these fighters already violated the laws of war by not comporting to the 
legal criteria of combatants, their compliance “with a grant of parole relies on 
personal honor to a large degree.”52 The concept of parole exists within shari’a 
laws of war, but some released prisoners will actively deceive their captors 
in order to gain release. The Danish Guantánamo detainee Slimane Hadj 
Abderrahmane openly mocked the document he was required to sign on his 
conditional release: “They can use it [the pledge] as toilet paper over there in 
the United States.”53 The Danish government was forced to seize his passport 
when he attempted to travel to Chechnya to resume jihad.
Perhaps the United States should reexamine General Winfield Scott’s 
precedent during the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) of emphasizing 
religious authority in the parole process. Future salafists to be released from 
Guantánamo Bay could be made to take a detailed oath “not to reengage” 
from an Islamic imam in order to help impart the gravity of the act they are 
Administration of the oath 
by an imam was “one of the 
most interesting ideas I’ve 
heard.”
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about to accept. This imam should explicitly instruct the prisoner on the re-
nowned 13th century theologian Ahmed Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwas, or religious 
edicts, governing oaths.54 In his collection of fatwas, Ibn Taymiyyah states 
that all conditions agreed to in any contract between Muslim parties (so 
long as that particular condition does not violate a clear obligation of faith) 
is religiously binding. A condition of release should be a firm understanding 
that if a parolee is ever caught in the commission of hostile acts against the 
United States or its allies, the recaptured offender will be subject to a tribunal 
according to military law and the international law of armed conflict. While 
skeptical that an oath administered by a Muslim cleric would make much of 
a difference with some detainees, one staff judge advocate felt the administra-
tion of the oath by an imam was “one of the most interesting ideas I’ve heard, 
particularly because it reflects the reality that the states accepting parolees 
have governments which are intertwined with Islam.”55 
On this topic, documents recovered at Osama bin Laden’s home after he was 
killed in 2011 reveal an increasingly legalistic interpretation from bin Laden 
on oath-breaking under shari’a. Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen 
from Pakistan who tried to detonate a car bomb in New York’s Times Square 
in May 2010, drew a surprising rebuke from bin Ladin. According to one 
analyst, “it was not the prospect of civilian deaths that upset Bin Laden, but 
rather the fact that Shahzad had planned the act after swearing a loyalty oath 
to the United States as a newly naturalized citizen.”56
Bin Laden wrote:
You have perhaps followed the media trial of brother Faisal 
Shahzad, may God release him, during which the brother was 
asked to explain his attack [against the United States] in view 
of having taken an oath [not to harm it] when he was awarded 
his American citizenship. He responded that he lied … [The lie] 
amounts to betrayal (ghadr) and does not fall under permissible 
lying to the enemy [during times of war] … [We must therefore 
act swiftly] to remove the suspicion that jihadis violate their oath 
and engage in ghadr.57
Categorizing a released Guantánamo detainee who has signed an agree-
ment not to re-engage in hostilities as “paroled” is the most accurate choice 
of label, and it should be used to describe those who end up reengaging 
coalition forces. All detainees to be released should be made to sign a non-
reengagement oath, or they should not be released. Continuing to utilize the 
term “recidivist” to identify those who reengage in hostile activities against 
the United States and her allies only perpetuates a false concept of who they 
are and the gravity of their actions. The Obama administration already refers 
to the ARB as a “parole board.” It is high time this designation was made of-
ficial, and those who are released from Guantánamo called parolees.Released 
prisoners who reengage against the United States or our allies must be identi-
fied as the parole violators they are, and judged according to the laws of war 
if recaptured. This suggestion offers an alternate method of conceptualizing 
the case of the Guantánamo detainees. It would make sense to start now, 
with the 171 Guantánamo prisoners who remain in custody. 
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Teenage Spy: Infiltrating the Irish Republican Army
MAJ Gregory Mayer, PE, USAFThe ability to infiltrate a group in order to obtain tactical intel-
ligence is a critical weapon against terrorist organizations. Open-source 
literature on human intelligence does not provide many examples of terrorist 
infiltration, but a notable exception is the story of Martin McGartland, who 
successfully infiltrated the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) as a 
teenager while he was working for the British Special Branch. Recruited at 
the age of sixteen, McGartland ultimately helped save more than fifty lives 
and helped affect the outcome of the violence in Northern Ireland.
How does an intelligence agency recruit a spy to target terrorists, especially 
when discovery would carry deadly consequences? This article outlines the 
weapons of influence, the specific subconscious triggers that an intelligence 
service case officer can use to recruit an agent, and that will help persuade a 
new recruit to comply with requests.1 These methods, developed long ago, 
can still be useful as counter-terrorism intelligence officers seek ways to influ-
ence, infiltrate, and undermine terrorist organizations. 
Principles of Influence 
A case officer can use six specific “triggers” to influence an agent’s decisions: 
reciprocation, commitment and consistency, liking, social proof, scarcity, 
and authority. These six triggers, or rules, which are briefly defined below, 
can be used to exploit the human tendency to use shortcuts in the decision-
making process, rather than to weigh the consequences of every choice 
before reaching a decision.
The rule of reciprocation states that, “we should try to repay, in kind, what 
another person has provided us.”2 All human societies appear to subscribe in 
some degree to this rule, which obligates a receiver to repay gifts, courtesies, 
invitations, and the like. The rule of reciprocation is so strong that a feeling 
of indebtedness will prompt many people to comply with a request they 
would normally decline; all that is required is a small gift or kindness to be 
bestowed before the request is made.3
The rule of consistency stems from the fact that all humans desire to be—
and appear to others to be—consistent in their actions, even if the actions 
are detrimental to their best interests. Being consistent in action is a shortcut 
in place of having to think through every action. Consistency is used as a 
weapon of influence when it is paired with commitment: Once someone 
commits to a cause, that person naturally tends to shape his or her actions to 
be consistent with the commitment.4
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The rule of liking notes that humans prefer to comply with the requests of 
individuals whom they like. Studies have shown that certain characteristics 
increase likability, and therefore the power to influence. These characteristics 
include physical attractiveness, similarity to the target, offering compli-
ments, contact and cooperation, and association.5
The rule of social proof tells us that people tend to look at others for cues 
on how they should behave or react. This is especially true under conditions 
of unfamiliarity and uncertainty, or when someone observes others within a 
similar demographic behaving in a particular way.6
The rule of scarcity shows us that opportunities or possessions seem more 
valuable if they are limited in supply or duration. This rule is closely linked 
with the psychological reactance theory, which states that when items (free-
doms, goods, services) become scarce, people desire those items significantly 
more than they did when the goods were readily available.7
Finally, the rule of authority dictates that humans have a tendency to obey 
people who are in charge. Symbols of power, such as titles, clothing, jew-
elry, or expensive vehicles, tend to reinforce the desire to obey, even in the 
absence of genuine authority.8
Recruitment into the Special Branch
The British Special Branch recruited Martin McGartland to be a spy in 1987. 
To understand the recruitment process, it is important first to have a clear 
picture of McGartland’s environment, as well as the historical context of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army at that time.
In 1969, three monumental events took place in Ireland. First, riots erupted 
in Belfast as pro-union loyalists (largely Protestant groups, who favored 
keeping Ireland under the direct rule of London) clashed with nationalist 
Catholics, burning entire Catholic neighborhoods to the ground. Second, 
the British sent Army troops into Northern Ireland to quell the unrest. 
Third, the Irish Republican movement, which advocated independence from 
the United Kingdom for Northern Ireland, fractured over the use of armed 
violence. One faction formed the PIRA to counter the sense of defenseless-
ness shared by many minority Catholics in Northern Ireland. The PIRA 
believed that the British military presence demanded an armed response, 
and that the British people would not be able to sustain a long bombing and 
shooting campaign.9
This was the reality that Martin McGartland faced while growing up in Bel-
fast: Protestant-controlled police and the British Army were fighting a war 
of attrition against the PIRA. His childhood Catholic neighborhood was in 
the heart of PIRA-controlled territory, and he grew up disliking all authority 
figures, whether they were the state security forces who invaded his neigh-
borhood to search houses and arrest people, or the PIRA goons who admin-
istered harsh local justice to anyone they deemed out of line. By 1987, nearly 
18,000 British troops were in Northern Ireland and the security situation 
In Belfast, Protestant-
controlled police and the 
British Army were fighting a 
war of attrition against the 
PIRA.
CTX | Vol. 2, No. 3
60
remained grim: 674 shootings, 236 bomb explosions, 148 bombs neutralized, 
955 armed robberies, 1,130 people injured, and 95 people killed.10 That year 
Special Branch representatives approached 16-year old McGartland.
The Special Branch used reciprocation techniques right from the beginning 
of their effort to recruit the boy. His first interaction with the Special Branch 
occurred when a police officer walked up to him on the street and said 
he had a couple of mates who might be able to help McGartland pass his 
driving exam. All he had to do was take a taxi to within two miles of a Royal 
Ulster Constabulary base, then walk the rest of the way. The encounter in-
trigued McGartland, and he complied with the offer—a process that forced 
him to make a commitment to meet with the case agents because he had to 
expend quite a bit of effort just to have his first meeting.11
Once he arrived at the police station, the Special Branch case officers identi-
fied themselves and reaffirmed that they could help McGartland get his 
driving license. In the meantime, they said, they needed his help to keep an 
eye on some troublemakers in his neighborhood. At this point, McGartland 
did not know he would be spying on PIRA members. If he was not inter-
ested, McGartland was told, he could go home and forget all about the offer 
(an instance of using the law of scarcity—act now or it won’t be available 
later). McGartland agreed to meet the officers again, and at this second 
meeting they had him memorize a phone number, gave him a code name, 
and instructed him about how to contact them in the future—all actions 
that reinforced their authority over the situation. They also gave him £40, 
which was another use of the reciprocation rule.12
McGartland explains in his memoir how excited he was after this second 
meeting. He had £40 in his pocket and two new friends he felt he could 
trust. They had made him feel important. At this point, he had no idea 
what his contacts wanted him to do, but he knew they were important 
because they were Special Branch officers, not normal police. In fact, these 
Special Branch recruiters were successfully exploiting the rules of liking and 
authority.13
Only after their fourth meeting did the Special Branch officers finally ask 
McGartland to do anything, and by this point he was thoroughly com-
mitted. First, they told him he would be earning £400 per month while 
working for the Special Branch, which was very enticing for a young man 
who had been pulling in about £400 to £800 per month fencing stolen 
goods door-to-door in his neighborhood. These payments are another 
example of reciprocity. Next, they started showing McGartland photos of 
people they wanted him to be on the lookout for, and maps of where they 
lived. After looking for these people for several weeks, he finally spotted 
one and relayed the person’s vehicle registration number back to the Special 
Branch. After providing information about several more men, McGartland 
finally was told by the Special Branch officers that he’d been spying on 
members of the PIRA. By the time he learned that information, McGartland 
was fully committed to being an agent for the Special Branch.14
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How the Relationship Changed over Time
The first major change in McGartland’s behavior occurred late in 1987. He 
observed one of his targets standing on a lone corner, and something seemed 
out of place. The next night, he saw the man again in the same location and 
instinctively knew something nefarious was happening. McGartland seized 
the initiative and began to secretly watch the man. After a short while, he 
saw another well-known troublemaker arrive along a footpath to meet with 
the first man. McGartland called in the information to his handlers who 
praised him for the job he was doing. The next day, the Special Branch told 
McGartland that he had helped foil a PIRA plot to detonate a bomb along 
the path when it was used by police or Army foot patrols.15 This encounter 
displays an example of a commitment that has produced inner change. 
McGartland had made a commitment to the Special Branch to be a 
spy, and was now starting to take consistent action that aligned with his 
self-image of what a spy should do; he was going above and beyond what 
was initially asked of him.16 
Up to this point, McGartland had supported the PIRA in taking a stand 
against the hardline Protestant paramilitary groups who were killing Repub-
licans and Catholics. He did not like the PIRA punishment squads, however, 
who would strong-arm their own people and beat young troublemakers with 
metal clubs or shoot them in the kneecaps to enforce PIRA authority in the 
neighborhoods. His faith in the PIRA, however, was completely shattered 
on November 8, 1987, Remembrance Sunday, when a PIRA bomb at the 
Eneskillin War Memorial killed 11 people and injured 63 others, including 
women and children.17 In McGartland’s own words, “That single bombing 
ended any doubts that I had experienced over my intelligence work and 
re-doubled my resolve to do everything possible to end the sectarian violence 
and save innocent people’s lives.”18 
It appears that the Special Branch officers sensed McGartland’s new resolve. 
Just three days after the Eneskillin bombing, they met with him for a serious 
discussion. Over dinner, they told him how impressed they were with his 
intelligence work and said they wanted him to do more. They asked him to 
start frequenting clubs that were known to be PIRA recruiting grounds, and 
to bolster his relationship with any childhood friends who had joined the 
PIRA. McGartland was hesitant, but he expressed a sense of obligation to 
comply because the Special Branch was paying him 400 pounds a month; he 
was firmly bound at this point by the rule of reciprocation.19
Shortly after taking on his new assignment, McGartland was hired by the 
PIRA to provide security for a construction site. While not a formal member 
of the PIRA, he was making inroads, and the Special Branch was thrilled. 
McGartland spent four more months identifying many PIRA members from 
the clubs, and then the Special Branch bought him a car worth £1,600. 
With this vehicle, McGartland started working as an unofficial taxi driver, 
and the PIRA began using him to transport punishment squads. At this 
point, the Special Branch rigged the car with a tracking device so they could 
pinpoint its location at any time. They also gave McGartland a special radio 
with a concealed device that he could use to notify his case officers when 
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he urgently needed to meet them. Finally, they arranged for McGartland to 
get his own flat so he wouldn’t have to live with his mother. The new car, 
the high-tech spy gear, and the new apartment all contributed to the rule of 
authority for the Special Branch, and also served as significant contributions 
to the rule of reciprocation.20
One day, a childhood friend of McGartland’s asked him to come and meet 
Davy Adams, who was the cousin of Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams and 
a powerful PIRA leader in West Belfast. Adams was impressed that McGart-
land didn’t mind taxiing PIRA members around in his vehicle, even when 
they had bomb-making materials. He formally asked McGartland to join 
the PIRA, and McGartland agreed. Adams placed McGartland in the PIRA 
intelligence wing and had him reconnoitering targets once or twice a week; 
he would scope out the house of a member of the police or Army whom the 
PIRA had targeted for execution, watch his movements, and look for vulner-
abilities on how to kill the target, all the while informing the Special Branch 
about the potential targets. Eventually, McGartland was also recruited into 
a nine-man PIRA operational cell that would plan and execute assassinations 
and bombings—without much success since McGartland was foiling their 
operations.21
Because of his success in thwarting so many operations, McGartland eventu-
ally began to feel that his cellmates suspected him of being an informer. 
At one point, he was told that a planned bombing had been canceled, but 
his cell then completed the operation without his knowledge. From that 
moment, he knew that the PIRA suspected him of working with the Special 
Branch. In the end, a tasking coordination group comprising officers of the 
Special Air Service, MI5, Special Branch, and military intelligence acted on a 
piece of intelligence concerning upcoming operations that McGartland had 
passed to the Special Branch. This action finally exposed the young spy, since 
he was one of the very few members who knew of the planned operations 
and was already under suspicion within the PIRA.22
A few days later, McGartland was detained by the PIRA and taken to a flat 
on the third floor of an apartment building to be interrogated. The Special 
Branch was watching, but had lost sight of McGartland when he was 
abducted so did not see which building he was taken into. They blanketed 
the area with security forces and helicopters to search for him, which scared 
his captors, who were waiting for the interrogation team. After being held, 
tied up, for seven hours in the apartment, McGartland asked to use the 
bathroom. When he came out of the bathroom, he hurled himself through a 
window to escape, falling three stories and sustaining massive injuries. When 
McGartland recovered from his injuries, the British placed him into protec-
tive custody, ending his four years as a Special Branch spy.23
Effect of the Relationship on International Events
In 1997, a senior intelligence officer in London confirmed the worth of 
McGartland’s work: “At least fifty men are still walking the streets of Northern 
Ireland today, thanks to the heroic work of Martin McGartland.”24 The work 
he performed was part of a broad and deep intelligence effort to infiltrate the 
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PIRA, which had an enormous impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
In the late 1970s, the PIRA had been forced to reorganize its command struc-
ture, moving away from a traditional hierarchy of brigades, battalions, and 
companies and placing new recruits into smaller, independent cells known 
as active service units. This reorganization was in direct response to both 
intelligence infiltration and the ability of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
interrogation squads to break members who had been detained. The smaller 
service units would limit the number of people aware of ongoing opera-
tions, so if someone did break or a cell was infiltrated, the damage would be 
contained.25
The change in organizational structure, however, still left the PIRA sus-
ceptible to infiltration. After Libya began supplying arms and explosives 
to the PIRA—an estimated 30 tons in 1985 and 1986—the security forces 
became very good at uncovering hidden arms caches. As the discoveries 
mounted, the PIRA undertook a long-term investigation to determine who 
was revealing the locations and movement of weapons. The group got an 
unexpected view of its susceptibility to infiltration when it learned that 
the man who for two years had held the post of quartermaster-general of 
the Belfast Brigade, and thus was responsible for all the city’s weapons and 
explosives, had been a Royal Ulster Constabulary informer for more than 
eight years.26
In the end, the massive intelligence infiltration campaign was one ingre-
dient in a recipe that pressured the PIRA to come to the peace table. The 
true legacy of Martin McGartland is that he was able to save lives while also 
helping to impel the terrorist organization toward the peace process.
Conclusion
The story of Martin McGartland’s infiltration raises numerous ethical 
questions related to recruiting a teenager to spy on a terrorist organization, 
which are outside the scope of this short article. The purpose here is to show 
how intelligence agencies can influence people to do dangerous work, even 
against their initial inclinations. A key factor in McGartland’s recruitment 
was how his Special Branch handlers used specific triggers to entice him to 
comply with their requests. The triggers most commonly used were recip-
rocation, commitment and consistency, authority, and liking. In the begin-
ning, the teenager’s focus was on making some money and enjoying the 
thrill of working for the Special Branch, but eventually McGartland became 
fully committed to the new cause. At that point, his handlers were able to 
tap into his inner reasons for compliance: a desire to save innocent lives. 
McGartland admits in his memoirs that his case officer would reinforce his 
resolve whenever he had doubts by saying, “Remember, Marty, what you’re 
doing. You’re not simply saving a man’s life, but the life of someone’s father, 
someone’s husband or someone’s son. They will never know what you did 
for them. But you will know. When this is all over, you will realize the lives 
you saved by your courage.”27 This quote illustrates the ultimate lesson from 
this case study: real compliance comes from aligning inner desires with 
operational requirements.28 
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Six months ago, in response to a question, I stood before a class of 
forty American and international military officers and told them they were 
not all heroes. Interestingly, my remarks were not met immediately with 
protests and rejection. That may be because the students respected my opin-
ion enough to at least listen and consider it, or it may be because a number 
of them agreed with me. Yet even as I expressed it, I knew that many of the 
fine men and women in service throughout the world did disagree with me. 
So, for the sake of discussion, here’s my case.
First of all, merely putting on a uniform or a badge doesn’t imbue anyone 
with heroic qualities. I wish it were that simple. I wish that every uniformed 
man and woman marching in every parade in every street in the world 
was automatically instilled with bravery, compassion, nobility of person, 
and impeccable moral judgment the minute they put that uniform on, or 
the minute they graduated from basic training. But experience and simple 
reason indicate that’s not the case. Becoming a hero, I believe, is more 
complicated than that.
Second, virtually every military, law enforcement, and fire protection 
institution I can think of offers awards for heroic conduct by its members. 
But obviously, not everyone who serves in such institutions receives such 
an award. In fact, these institutions typically present their awards for heroic 
conduct to select individuals in recognition of extraordinary performance 
under extraordinary, usually life-threatening circumstances. I think, then, 
it’s fair to suggest that when the institutions they belong to don’t recognize 
everyone in uniform or behind a badge as a hero, maybe it’s because they’re 
not. Maybe most of them are decent, hard-working men and women, 
engaged in difficult jobs that demand self-sacrifice and dedication as they 
protect their societies. If so, they absolutely deserve all the gratitude, respect, 
and support their societies can extend. They just don’t deserve—and I 
suspect most of them don’t need or want—to be placed on a pedestal and 
worshipped as heroes. 
Third, not everyone who joins the military does so with heroic intentions. Put 
another way, there are lots of reasons why someone may choose to join and 
serve in the armed forces: for the job security, the benefits, for the personal 
challenge, for the opportunity to test themselves; because the military is the 
best of possible alternatives, because they see no other choice; because they 
want to get away from home, to find themselves, to prove something to 
someone else, to spite someone else. All of these reasons seem to me under-
standable. These are the ordinary motivations of regular people, trying to cope. 
They are not necessarily the motivations of heroes seeking to put themselves 
in harm’s way to protect others. Some of these regular people will certainly go 
on to do profoundly heroic things when the situation demands it of them, and 
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Why am I telling you this? What does this have to do with ethics? I believe 
when a society indiscriminately labels everyone who serves to protect it a 
hero, it renders a profound moral disservice in three ways. It burdens those 
who serve with the responsibility of being a hero always. It places them 
on a superior moral plane, and then expects them to conduct every aspect 
of their lives in accordance with that superior standard. By automatically 
labeling them as heroes, we imply that they’re somehow better than the rest 
of society, regardless of whether they see themselves that way. When they 
falter, they‘re often seen as disappointments, not only as individuals, but as 
representatives of their institution. We essentially put them up on a high 
moral shelf and keep them there. That’s the first disservice. 
The second disservice begins insidiously for some people. It’s my observation 
that the need always to meet a higher moral standard can eventually cause 
powerful, contradictory, and unanticipated reactions in some military and 
law enforcement professionals. Some individuals who, throughout their 
careers, have taken justifiable pride in living under and meeting a higher 
ethical standard can, over time, develop a sense of disdain and disregard for 
the very societies they swore to protect. They can draw the conclusion that 
the society they serve is actually morally inferior in comparison to them-
selves and, therefore, not necessarily worthy of their full respect. Or, as one 
former U.S. officer put it, “How can we not think of ourselves as morally 
superior when society expects us to be and tells us we are?” That officer, I 
think, has a point.
The third disservice is simply this: when a society paintbrushes everyone 
who serves to protect it a hero, it indirectly denies those protectors their 
humanity and experiences. I once had a U.S. Navy SEAL tell me that combat 
is an orgy of hatred and violence. Yet even in such a dehumanizing envi-
ronment, society often expects that “our heroes” will conduct themselves 
nobly and never commit un-heroic deeds. They will always be brave, noble, 
unshaken by the experience. Because they are heroes, they will not feel guilt 
for what they’ve seen or done, will not experience PTSD, or require treatment 
upon returning home. Rather, because they’re heroes, they’ll return home 
unchanged and resume their lives and duties as paragons of moral virtue. 
What I am suggesting is that by labeling all those who serve and protect as 
heroes, a society conveniently distances itself from its protectors and, I be-
lieve, very often conveniently absolves itself of the real ethical responsibility 
of confronting the hard, frequently ugly truths of the sacrifices, horrors, and 
traumas that those who serve and protect have endured.
Do real heroes exist? Of course they do. I’ve met a couple: humble men of 
unparalleled bravery and virtue, who, in a terrible situation, managed to 
accomplish the valorous and extraordinary. But I’ve known a lot more men 
and women who are simply doing the very best they can to protect their 
society, sometimes at great personal cost to themselves and their families. 
And while they are not heroes, they deserve better than to be given the label, 
and then discreetly ignored once they return home, the parade ends, and the 
uniform comes off. 
“How can we not think of 
ourselves as morally superior 
when society tells us we are?”
When society paintbrushes 
everyone who serves a 
hero, it indirectly denies 
[them] their humanity and 
experiences.
Vol. 2, No. 3 | CTX 
67
Not Just a Russian Platoon in Afghanistan
THE MOVING IMAGE
Watching this story of Russian infantrymen in Afghanistan in 
1988, veterans of the current war may sense they have shared not just the 
geography, but the same enemy, the same struggles, and the same ultimately 
unattainable objective.
A joint Russian-Finnish-Ukrainian production, 9th Company carries the 
familiar Hollywood war movie tag, “based on actual events.” Indeed, there 
was a 9th Company, part of the 345th Guards Airborne Regiment, which 
fought in most of the major battles of the Soviet-Afghan War. During the 
initial invasion in 1979, it was the 9th Company that stormed President 
Hafizullah Amin’s palace in Kabul. The soldiers’ optimistic view that the 
Afghan campaign would be over in a few weeks was mistaken. Nine years 
later, the company was part of a major offensive to open the road between 
Khost and Gardez. On January 7th and 8th, 1988, over two hundred muja-
hideen attacked their outpost on Hill 3234 along the mountain road, but the 
39 Russian paratroopers, with the aid of continuous artillery and air support, 
heroically held their ground. In the end, six Russians were dead, and all but 
five were wounded. This sacrifice went unrewarded. A year later, all Russian 
combat troops were ordered to withdraw from Afghanistan.
These are the historical outlines of the company’s story. First-time director Fyodor 
Bondarchuk, however, takes considerable artistic license to tell a different tale. 
In his version, when the fight begins, the company loses radio contact with its 
brigade, so no one knows the men are under relentless attack by the mujahi-
deen. When relief forces finally arrive, there is only a single Russian survivor. This 
recalls similar “desperate last stand” movies like Seven Samurai (1954), Steel Bayonet 
(1957), Black Hawk Down (2001), and even Aliens (1986).
But Bondarchuk has put much more into this film than a familiar to-the-
last-man version of this battle (he also adds himself, playing one of the 
seasoned paratroopers). The movie follows several pals, each with his own 
motives, who volunteer to do their internationalist duty in Afghanistan. In 
serial episodes, they bid tearful farewell to family and girlfriends, endure in-
tense training that bonds them, arrive as wide-eyed replacements at Bagram 
airfield, then join the hard-bitten fraternity of combat infantrymen in the 
hills, valleys, and villages of eastern Afghanistan. Again, this is a standard 
war movie sequence, firmly established by Beau Geste (1939), and brilliantly 
executed in Gallipoli (1981). Bondarchuk has a notable cinematic pedigree—
his father, Sergei Bondarchuk, directed the monumental, Oscar-winning 
War and Peace (1965–68). Still, despite the emotional strength and visual 
impact of many of the scenes, the film feels uneven and sometimes awkward 
in its pacing, scripting, acting, and storyline. For example, these parachute 
troops don’t seem to go through parachute training, which is too bad, as the 
director missed all the possible amplifying plot-points there. Then again, at 
two hours and nineteen minutes long, the movie needs less, not more.
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What makes 9th Company worth watching? It’s certainly no primer, good 
or bad, on counterinsurgency. The occasional vignettes that may evoke a 
sense of déjà vu in some U.S. and allied veterans of the current war are not 
sufficient to qualify the movie as a cautionary tale. The rip-roaring combat 
sequences have been done as well, maybe better, in Generation Kill (2008). 
That said, several aspects of the film commend it to military professionals. 
What cinema fans will recognize in 9th Company is a fresh take on the 
standard cast of war movie characters. Call the roll, they’re present for duty: 
the college kid, the mama’s boy, the loudmouth, the steely captain, the 
war-worn colonel, the apathetic “Remf,” the battle-wise squad leader, the 
camp instructor (here, as a weary political officer teaching Afghan culture), 
and that classic war movie figure, the drill sergeant. Warrant Officer Dygalo 
(Mikhail Porechenkov) joins Gunnery Sergeant Foley (Lou Gosset, Jr.) from 
An Officer and a Gentleman (1982), and Gunnery Sergeant Hartman (R. Lee 
Ermey) from Full Metal Jacket (1987), in the “War Movie Drill Instructor 
Hall of Fame.”
But the central appeal of the film is the full-blooded Russification of these 
stock characters. This makes for both an entertaining turn on these roles, 
and also some Tolstoyan insights: the brutality of Red Army boot camp; the 
cynicism of the sergeants; the fatalism of the veterans; and a distinctly Rus-
sian view of what is just and unjust in life and war. A good way to appreciate 
this is to watch and listen to the film in the original Russian, with subtitles 
in the language of choice. Filmed in the Crimea and Uzbekistan, the stark, 
sandpapery locations have the striking look and feel of Afghanistan. The 
native costumes are genuine Afghan. Also, the Russian tanks, helicopters, 
and weapons are the real thing, thanks to the Ukrainian armed forces, which 
provided all the correct Soviet-era kit.
Criticized by many “Afghantsi” veterans for its inaccuracies, 9th Company 
was nonetheless a box-office smash in Russia, and won the Nika (the Russian 
Oscar award) for Best Film. There are some documentary approximations. 
Armadillo (2010) recounts the deployment of a Danish army unit to Afghan-
istan, from departure to return, and raised a debate about the role of their 
forces in that war. Restrepo (2010; reviewed in CTX vol.1, no.1) reveals why 
the United States military made so little progress in Afghanistan in the first 
eight years of its war there; At War (2007) delivers much the same message. 
Among fictional accounts, Platoon (1986), about a dysfunctional American 
unit in the Vietnam War, may excel in terms of drama, but doesn’t match 
9th Company in its concluding commentary on how soldiers come to grips 
with having fought a war with no victory and no defeat.
Twenty years later, and about a hundred miles from 9th Company’s fight 
for Hill 3234, a lone American platoon guarded an outpost by the village of 
Wanat, near the Pakistani border. On July 13, 2008, the 48 U.S. paratroopers 
of 2nd Platoon, “C” Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry 
Regiment, with 24 Afghan Army troops, fought off repeated assaults by over 
two hundred Taliban guerrillas. The paratroopers lost nine dead, including 
their platoon leader, but they held their ground. Three days later, they were 
ordered to abandon the outpost and leave the valley. The men of 9th Com-
pany could’ve told them how that felt. 
[This is] a distinctly Russian 
view of what is just and unjust 
in life and war.
A commentary on how 
soldiers come to grips with… 
a war with no victory and no 
defeat.
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Find, Fix, Finish: Inside The Counterterrorism Campaigns That 
Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al-Qaeda
THE WRITTEN WORD
Nate Moir
Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach 
(2012) 




Find, Fix, Finish is a well-written, fast-paced, and compelling overview of 
U.S. counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the 
United States since 9/11. Authors Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach are former 
counterterrorism officials with the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, respectively. Their collaboration 
credibly dissects the evolving legal and operational complexities of con-
ducting counterterrorism.  
The book is organized into 12 chapters that present a mix of analysis and case 
studies. For instance, chapter 2, “Atrophy: National Security before 9/11,” 
assesses pre-9/11 counterterrorism mindsets, while chapter 11, “Geronimo,” 
describes the stalking and killing of Osama bin Laden.  By developing their 
work in this way, the authors balance the tragedy of 9/11 with the ways 
in which progress and failure have informed and shaped U.S. counterter-
rorism efforts since then. One of the most positive outcomes over time is 
the improvement in interagency cooperation and international liaisons with 
partners, which have greatly enhanced counterterror-
ism’s success.  This is a theme that becomes evident as 
the book progresses, although it is not explicitly noted 
until the final chapters.
In the initial period following the 9/11 World Trade 
Center attacks, U.S. counterterrorism was conducted 
in a “go it alone” atmosphere, and encountered some 
notable pitfalls. This was particularly the case regarding 
the incarceration and interrogation in 2003 of Khalid 
Shaykh Mohammed, the apparent mastermind of the 
attacks. The alleged extreme interrogation methods 
used on KSM, as he is known in the press, sparked 
wide controversy over the ways in which intelligence 
was being extracted from high value targets. While 
the authors do not preach, they provide a number of 
cases to demonstrate that due diligence, through the 
compiling of evidence and legal prosecution, proved 
more successful than “enhanced interrogation” because 
of the follow-on intelligence potential. Chapter 9, “The 
Enemy Within,” for example, traces the case of Na-
jibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant who plotted with 
two friends to attack New York City’s subways with 
triacetone triperoxide-based explosives. In Zazi’s case, 
interagency cooperation between the FBI and NYPD 
was initially problematic, but their work improved as 
officers from the two agencies overcame past misgivings 
and lack of trust. In contrast to the KSM interrogations, 
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the authors suggest that the Zazi prosecution was successful due to the 
downright hard work of intelligence analysis, improved communication, 
and willingness to share information. In other words, they imply, positive 
outcomes are more likely when extreme interrogations techniques, i.e., 
torture, are avoided.
Another intriguing theme in the book regards the conduct of operations 
that have reached critical decision points. For instance, is taking out a high 
value target to stop him from acting worth the loss of potential intelligence 
that might reveal a related network or the target’s associates? Again, the book 
uses a number of examples to show that this dilemma has no set formulas 
for success. What is more, the authors note, the risk of alienating or even 
radicalizing local populations when drone strikes or other operations kill or 
injure civilians cannot be ignored. 
This well-researched book has one prominent shortcoming, which is the au-
thors’ reliance on current journalism for a substantial amount of their source 
material. An example of this is the recent death (on June 4, 2012) of Abu 
Yahya al-Libi, the alleged Number Two in al Qaeda’s hierarchy. Chapter 8, 
“An Increasing Preference for Lethal Ends,” details the death of al-Libi in 
January 2008, while other records indicate that he was killed in December 
2009. Al-Libi’s third demise in June 2012 demonstrates that Peritz and 
Rosenbach are dealing with fleeting information that is difficult to verify; 
a bit more explanation as to the reliability or unreliability of sources would 
have strengthened their work overall. As it is, this uncertainty undermines 
the analysis in that entire chapter.  
Despite this weakness, not uncommon to books on current events, Find, Fix, 
Finish is a worthwhile overview of U.S. counterterrorism over the past dozen 
years. While well-informed readers may need to look elsewhere for new 
information, the book offers a useful analysis of what the United States has 
learned from its mistakes, and how it continues to refine its operations.    
ABOUT THE REVIEWER
Nate Moir is a senior research analyst with the Program for Culture and 
Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School.  He is also a Psychological 
Operations Officer in the U.S. Army Reserve and completed a deployment 
to Afghanistan in 2011 as a Detachment Commander. 
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RESOURCES: PUBLICATIONS
Lieutenant Colonel Derek Jones wrote this comprehensive study of clan-
destine cellular networks and their effect on counterinsurgency operations 
in 2008, while a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. His award-winning monograph provides a theoretical, 
doctrinal, and operational understanding of the form, function, and logic 
of these networks, offering readers useful insights into their complex nature. 
LTC Jones warns that failure to thoroughly understand clandestine cellular 
networks has implications for the way network theorists study and model 
networks, as well as for those who plan how to defeat them. The author ends 
with several recommendations for the U.S. military, on ways to approach the 
problem of clandestine cellular networks.
In this monograph Dr. Shultz advances our understanding of al-Qaeda 
through an analysis of the shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of be-
havior that comprise the strategic culture of this non-traditional adversary. 
Through a strategic culture framework, he identifies and assesses the factors 
and developments that have shaped al-Qaeda’s evolution and behavior over 
nearly two decades. Dr. Shultz traces the internal debates and strategic-level 
decision making amongst al-Qaeda factions following the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, and the subsequent strategic reassessment as the mu-
jahidin were sent to other geographical areas to pursue operations against 
both a “near” and “far” enemy. An examination of al-Qaeda’s discourse 
over core strategic subjects of doctrine, strategy, operational art, and related 
issues offers valuable insights into the behavior of al-Qaeda and its affiliated 
movements.
Counterterrorism expert James Forest assesses the threat Boko Haram poses 
to Nigeria and U.S. national security interests. As Dr. Forest notes, Boko 
Haram is largely a local phenomenon,  though one with strategic implica-
tions, and must be understood and addressed within its local context and 
the long standing grievances that motivate terrorist activity. He describes 
Nigeria’s ethnic fissures and the role of unequal distribution of power in 
fueling terrorism, which, combined with the ready availability of weapons, 
contribute to Nigeria’s other security threats, including militancy in the 
Niger Delta and organized crime around the economic center of the country, 
Lagos. To meet the security challenges posed by Boko Haram and others, 
Dr. Forest advocates the use of intelligence-led policing and trust-building 
between the government and citizenry.    
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